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Abstract
We investigate whether the discounts offered by online daily deals help attract consumer pur-
chases. By tracking the sales of 19,978 deals on Groupon.com and conducting a battery of
identification and falsification tests, we find that deep discounts reduce sales. A one-percent
increase in a deal’s discount decreases sales by 0.035–0.256 percent. If a merchant offers 10 per-
cent more discount from the sample mean of 55.6 percent, the sales could decrease by 0.63–4.60
percent, or 0.80–5.24 units and $42–$275 in revenue. This negative effect of discount is more
prominent among credence goods and deals with low sales, and when the deals are offered in
cities with higher income and better education. Our findings suggest that consumers are con-
cerned about product quality and excessive discounts may reduce sales immediately. A follow-up
lab experiment provides further support to this quality concern explanation. Furthermore, it
suggests the existence of a “threshold”, viz. the negative effect on sales is present only when the
discount is sufficiently high. Additional empirical analysis shows that deals displaying favorable
third-party support, such as Facebook fans and online reviews, are more susceptible to this
adverse discount effect. We draw related managerial implications.
Keywords: daily deal; Groupon; price promotion; quality concern; uncertainty; online markets
†Department of Technology and Operations Management, Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University,
3062 PA Rotterdam, The Netherlands. ‡Department of Information Systems, Business Statistics and Operations
Management, School of Business and Management, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Clear Water
Bay, Kowloon, Hong Kong. Cao: cao@rsm.nl, Hui: klhui@ust.hk, Xu: hxu@ust.hk.
1. Introduction
Online daily deal platforms, such as Groupon and LivingSocial, have become a prominent price
promotion venue (Dholakia 2011). Consumer surveys have shown that 60 percent of online visitors
to the top 40 websites enroll in at least one daily deal email program (Foresee 2012). One-sixth of
Americans aged 12 or above register for at least one daily deal service (Edison Research 2012). As
two-sided markets, daily deal platforms allow merchants to attract new consumers via discounts
(Subramanian and Rao 2016). They also provide consumers with a venue to explore a wide variety
of products and services in their regions (Dholakia and Kimes 2011; Wang et al. 2013).
Daily deal platforms charge merchants by performance-based commission, which is appealing
to small- and medium-sized local merchants with limited marketing budget. Instead of paying hefty
lump sum fees for advertising campaigns, merchants share a fraction of their revenues with the daily
deal platforms carrying their promotions. Daily deals are particularly effective in attracting new
customers (Constant Contact 2013). Almost 80 percent of daily deal vouchers are sold to first-time
customers during or even beyond their seventh promotion (Dholakia 2012).
Most daily deals offer substantial discounts. In general, discount should appeal to consumers
because it helps save costs (Blattberg et al. 1995). However, its effect is not trivial for online
daily deals because of the intrinsic uncertainty and risks involved in the setting. The spatial
and temporal separation between daily deal buyers and sellers encompasses significant information
asymmetry. Buyers cannot inspect the products before and usually do not consume the products
immediately after purchasing the deals (Pavlou et al. 2007; Ghose 2009; Dimoka et al. 2012). Hence,
consumers face a high degree of uncertainty and might worry that daily deal sellers could engage in
pre-contractual quality misrepresentation (adverse selection) or post-contractual quality reduction
(moral hazard). This is especially the case for merchants selling vouchers of experience or credence
goods, the quality of which is difficult to assess before consumption.
The uncertainty on quality is aggravated when most merchants on online daily deal platforms
are small- and medium-sized local merchants who are often less well known and less visible to
consumers. When consumers cannot assess product quality because of information asymmetry and
when the merchants are not well known, offering discounts may not help promote and sell the
products. In fact, discounts, or discounted prices, are often considered a signal of low quality (Rao
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and Monroe 1989; Kirmani and Rao 2000; Erdem et al. 2008).
Perhaps recognizing the concern on product quality, many online daily deal platforms provide
third-party support information as a supplementary quality signal. Such support signal may, how-
ever, contradict the price signal if consumers associate discounts with low quality. Prior research
suggests that, in the presence of multiple and inconsistent quality signals, there could be“negativity
bias” in that consumers may anchor on the negative signal (Boulding and Kirmani 1993; Smith and
Vogt 1995; Miyazaki et al. 2005). This implies that third-party support need not help the seller if
discount is considered as a negative signal. In fact, it may even arouse suspicion as consumers may
wonder why discount is necessary for such favorably-appraised products.
To test the empirical effect of discount in a setting where information asymmetry is inevitable,
we compiled a panel data set from a leading daily deal platform, Groupon.com, from January 8th
to March 31st, 2014. Our data set comprises 19,978 deals covering products and services in a wide
range of categories from 172 cities in the United States and Canada. We captured the characteristics
of each deal, including the discount offered, and recorded its hourly sales in terms of the number
of vouchers sold. Consumers can use the purchased vouchers to redeem the promoted products or
services at a later time. Our data set has a total of 1,835,794 observations. We conducted a series
of statistical tests to examine whether offering more discounts help the online daily deal merchants
sell more vouchers.
By estimating a panel data model with rich fixed effects to account for product characteristics
and time trends, and robust standard errors clustered by product subcategories to allow for cross-
item and intertemporal demand correlations over time, we find a significant negative effect of
discount on the number of vouchers sold. A one-percent increase in discount decreases sales by
0.0352 [0.0105, 0.0600] percent per hour.1 To our knowledge, prior research has not documented
such an immediate negative effect of discount on sales in a large-scale field setting.
A potential concern in our setting is that the discounts could be endogenous. For example,
there could be reverse causality, that merchants with higher sales enjoy better economies of scale
and hence could afford to offer bigger discounts to consumers. To strengthen our identification, we
conducted two instrumental variable (IV) estimations using exogenous IVs from multiple sources.
1 We report the 95-percent confidence intervals in parentheses throughout the paper.
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Furthermore, we conducted a cluster analysis and tested the discount effect on merchants with
differing degree of popularity. We also applied quantile regression and a sample selection model
that accommodates a continuous treatment variable (i.e., the discount in our case) (Garen 1984).
We find that the negative effect of discount is robust in all of these estimations, implying merchant
self-selection to offer discounts is not a potent explanation to our finding.
Overall, our various estimates using the whole sample suggest that if the merchants on Groupon
offer an additional 10 percent of discount from the sample mean of 55.6 percent, the sales of the
deals could drop by 0.63–4.60 percent, or 0.80–5.24 vouchers and $42–$275 in revenue. This effect
is economically significant as the deals are mostly offered by small businesses. More importantly,
the merchants may hope to increase their exposure through these discounted deals by, for example,
attracting consumers to their stores to make other purchases in the future. It defeats the merchants’
advertising or promotional purposes if the discounts drive consumers away.
We conducted additional tests to explore the nature of this negative discount effect. Specifically,
we isolated deals that are not subject to local congestion. We find that the negative discount effect
persists among these deals, meaning concerns on consumption congestion cannot explain the finding.
We then used three strategies to test whether concerns on product quality is a potent explanation.
The first strategy exploits differential quality uncertainty on credence vis-a`-vis experience goods
(Darby and Karni 1973; Emons 1997; Dulleck and Kerschbamer 2006). The second strategy exploits
the recent finding that well-sold deals tend to provide a better quality signal due to observational
learning (Li and Wu 2013; Luo et al. 2014; Subramanian and Rao 2016). The third strategy exploits
the fact that consumers with higher socioeconomic status (SES) tend to be less price sensitive and
more quality sensitive (Tirole 1988; Schaninger 1993; Magnusson et al. 2001). All three tests support
the presence of quality concern. The negative effect of discount on online daily deal sales is more
prominent among credence goods, deals with lower sales, and regions with higher SES.
Finally, we investigated whether displaying third-party support, viz. the number of Facebook
fans and review quotes, count, and rating from Yelp, Yahoo! and Google can help moderate the
adverse effect of discount on the sales of deal vouchers. We find that deals with more Facebook
fans, positive consumer comments, and higher review counts and rating are more vulnerable to the
adverse discount effect. This finding is consistent with the “negativity bias” theory (Boulding and
Kirmani 1993; Smith and Vogt 1995; Miyazaki et al. 2005). When consumers face two inconsistent
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quality cues, viz. the discount and favorable online third-party support, they tend to rely on the
negative cue in evaluating quality. Hence, the negative discount effect prevails.
To corroborate the empirical analysis, we conducted a lab experiment to directly test whether
quality concern underscores the negative discount effect. We systematically manipulated the dis-
counts in a set of realistically-created deals and measured the subjects’ uncertainty on the quality of
the promoted items. We find strong support to the quality concern explanation. More importantly,
the experimental results reveal an interesting threshold effect. The negative discount effect surfaces
only when the discount exceeds a certain threshold.
We make four important contributions. First, we present empirical evidence that discounts can
hurt sales and drive consumers away in an online setting where consumers are not familiar with the
merchants and cannot appraise the quality of the products before making purchases. Second, we pin
down quality concern as one driving force of this negative effect by presenting triangulated evidence
from both empirical analysis of large-scale field data and a tightly-controlled lab experiment. We
are thus among the first to rigorously demonstrate that the quality-signaling effect of discount
can dominate its cost-saving benefit to consumers in an online setting featuring insurmountable
information asymmetry. Third, we show that displaying favorable third-party support can backfire
when the discount is steep. Fourth, we uncover a novel threshold effect, that the discount negatively
affects sales only when it exceeds a certain threshold. We provide concrete guidance to merchants
on how to design better deals to attract more purchases through discounts and to platform owners
on how they can improve the daily deal business model.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys the related literature.
Section 3 describes the research setting. Section 4 presents the empirical model and estimation
results. Section 5 presents the lab experiment and the related analysis. Section 6 discusses the
implications of this research and concludes the paper.
2. Related Literature
This research is closely related to the literature on quality uncertainty and signaling in online
commerce. Consumers are often concerned about product quality in online transactions because
of the intrinsic prevalence of information asymmetry between sellers and buyers. There could be
adverse selection, where low quality sellers tend to join the market, and moral hazard, where sellers
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could reduce product quality after consumers have purchased their items (Dewan and Hsu 2004;
Jin and Kato 2006; Pavlou et al. 2007; Ghose 2009; Dimoka et al. 2012). Because of the concern
on product quality, consumers may use electronic channels only when product uncertainty is low
(Overby and Jap 2009) or when buying low value items (Kim and Krishnan 2015).
Prior research has proposed several solutions to address the quality concern in online transac-
tions. One solution is to offer promotions to acquire early customers, who may provide informative
quality signals to help attract other consumers. Theoretical analysis suggests that the group buy-
ing strategy with discounted pricing can achieve such quality signaling because of social interaction
and observational learning (Jing and Xie 2011; Hu et al. 2013; Subramanian and Rao 2016). This
strategy is particularly attractive to firms who are patient or relatively unknown (Shivendu and
Zhang 2013; Edelman et al. 2014). Empirical research has found supportive evidence to this strat-
egy. Group buying or daily deal websites can facilitate product sales by displaying information on
deal popularity or social influence (Li and Wu 2013; Luo et al. 2014; Wu et al. 2015).
Another common solution to addressing quality concern in online markets is to display third-
party reviews. In particular, positive online word of mouth (WOM) or user reviews can help increase
sales (Liu 2006; Dellarocas et al. 2007; Chintagunta et al. 2010), but negative reviews may decrease
sales (Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006; Chen et al. 2011). The effect of third-party reviews on sales is
moderated by contextual cues, such as reviewers’ identity, buyers’ Internet experience, or sellers’
brands (Forman et al. 2008; Zhu and Zhang 2010; Ho-Dac et al. 2013). More importantly, online
third-party reviews need not be credible because of reviewer self-selection, that early buyers tend
to like the product more than other people, or strategic manipulation by sellers (Dellarocas 2006;
Jin and Kato 2006; Mayzlin 2006; Li and Hitt 2008; Mayzlin et al. 2014).
Both of these two streams of research do not consider the direct impact of discounted pricing,
which is commonly used by online daily deal merchants to attract consumers. Ample experimental
evidence has shown that price is positively related to perceived quality (Rao and Monroe 1989).
Consumers may not have enough cognitive resources to evaluate all product attributes. Hence,
they may simply adopt a price-quality heuristic in appraising and choosing products (Rao 2005).
The information economics literature also suggests that it is rational for consumers to associate
price with quality because only high quality firms could afford to use high prices as quality signals
(Kirmani and Rao 2000; Rao 2005).
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Prior research suggests that such quality signaling effect of price is robust in different market
structures (see, e.g., Wolinsky 1983; Bagwell and Riordan 1991; Daughety and Reinganum 2008).
If consumers indeed use price as a quality signal, then the steep discounts offered by online daily
deals do not necessarily help merchants draw early customers, who may be instrumental in helping
the merchants build positive quality signals to attract future consumers. Furthermore, the negative
signal carried by discounted pricing may contradict the positive signal embodied in favorable third-
party reviews. The extant literature does not consider the nuanced signaling effect of discounted
pricing when analyzing other quality signaling mechanisms in online markets.
A related stream of work has considered how seller attributes, such as brand or website quality,
affect consumers’ product perceptions (Rao et al. 1999; Keller and Lehmann 2006; Wells et al. 2011;
Ho-Dac et al. 2013). In general, with asymmetric information, consumers utilize a wide variety of
marketing mix variables to infer product quality (Kirmani and Rao 2000). This study focuses on the
online daily deal setting where the brand effect is less salient because most merchants are relatively
unknown to consumers. Moreover, all merchants in this study offer their promotions on a common
online daily deal platform, meaning their websites are less relevant. Practically, unlike many online
shops that promote search products, most online daily deals feature experience or credence goods,
the quality of which cannot be easily inferred by marketing mix variables.
More broadly, this research is related to the vast price promotion literature (Blattberg et al.
1995). Frequent price promotions may affect brand sales negatively in the long run as consumers
adjust their reference prices (Lattin and Bucklin 1989), become more sensitive to price and promo-
tions (Mela et al. 1997), stockpile products (Mela et al. 1998), or form a poorer perception of the
brand over time (Jedidi et al. 1999; Erdem et al. 2008). Our setting departs from these studies in
that most buyers of online daily deals are first-time customers (Dholakia 2012). Hence, we study
the immediate effect of price promotion before these long-run mechanisms kick in.
To conclude, recent research has analyzed the merits of novel quality signaling mechanisms
such as group buying and third-party reviews in online markets. However, the prior literature is
relatively silent on how these mechanisms interact with discounted pricing, which itself may serve
as a salient quality signal about the promoted items. This research tests the net impact of discount
on sales with triangulated evidence in the online daily deal setting.
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3. The Setting
Ever since the daily deal business model was introduced in 2004, more than 100 daily deal websites
have emerged worldwide. Among them, Groupon has the highest awareness and commands con-
siderable pricing power against its merchants (Dholakia and Kimes 2011; Zhang and Chung 2016).
It offers an affordable means for small- and medium-sized local merchants to offer price promotions
to a large customer base. These promotions are carried in the form of vouchers sold at discounted
prices. The vouchers can then be used to redeem specific products or services later.
Groupon hosts many deals in multiple categories. It uses a dedicated page to describe each
deal and the deal’s merchant. The deals typically last for several days (the median lifespan of a deal
is 96 hours, or 4 days in our data set). Figure A.1 in the Online Appendix shows an example of a
deal on Groupon.com. We collected the data on 19,992 completed deals from Groupon.com from 8
January to 31 March 2014. Specifically, we scraped the attributes for each deal including its original
and transaction prices (price), discount percentage (discount), number of days until the voucher
expires after purchase (days before expiration), maximum quantity allowed for purchase per session
(maximum purchases allowed), number of purchase options (options), terms of use as specified by
the merchants under the “fine prints” section and, if available, number of Facebook fans (facebook
fans), quotes of reviews from third-party websites including Yelp, Yahoo!, and Google (has review
quotes), and the volume and valence (measured by average rating) of these reviews (review count
and average rating). Note that the third-party support, i.e., Facebook fans, online reviews, etc.,
is provided by the merchant before releasing its deals and remains fixed during the deal’s lifespan.
As is evident from its Terms of Sale, Groupon does not verify this merchant-supplied information.
Hence, the merchants always select positive reviews and comments to display on their pages.
For every deal in our data set, we recorded the number of vouchers sold (“sales”) in an hourly
interval using the Groupon Application Programming Interface (API). We obtained two additional
pieces of data through this API: (i) whether the deal’s webpage was created by Groupon or the
merchant itself using Groupon’s deal-building tool (merchant-created deal);2 and (ii) whether a deal
was sold out before the end of its preset duration (sold out finally). This variable indicates whether
2 Details about the Groupon API and Build-Your-Own-Deal tool are available at http://www.groupon.com/pages/
api and http://investor.groupon.com/releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=824464 (accessed 7 March 2017).
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the merchant has set a limit on the supply of the product.
Note that the Groupon API truncates the displayed sales. When the number of vouchers sold
lies between 10 and 1,000, it rounds the number down to the nearest multiples of 10. For example,
89 is reported as 80 and 101 is reported as 100. Moreover, when the number of vouchers sold
exceeds 1,000, it will not update the sales again until the sales reaches 5,000. The first type of
truncation should have little impact on our estimation because it applies to the whole data set and
so the noises should cancel each other out. To address the second type of truncation, we exclude
14 deals with sales exceeding 1,000. Hence, the final data set contains 19,978 deals.
Groupon organized the deals into 12 categories: Automotive services, beauty and spas, ed-
ucation, entertainment, food and drinks, health and fitness, medical treatments, home services,
nightlife and bars, pets services, restaurants, and other professional services. Each category further
contains multiple subcategories. Table 1 presents the number and percentage of deals in each cat-
egory. The top three categories are entertainment, beauty and spas, and restaurants. Our data set
covers 152 U.S. and 20 Canadian markets defined at the city or equivalent level. For the deals in
Canada, we converted the prices from Canadian dollar to U.S. dollar using the exchange rate on 6
May 2014. We present the complete list of subcategories and the 172 U.S. and Canadian markets
in the Online Appendix.
** Table 1. Deal Distribution **
We conducted a survey to check consumers’ familiarity of Groupon merchants. We randomly
selected five Groupon deals offered by local merchants in a big U.S. city within the Automotive and
Food and Drinks categories from our sample. We randomly selected another five brands offering
similar products in Amazon.com. We asked 50 subjects to rate their familiarity with each of these
10 merchants on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = less familiar, 7 = more familiar). The results show that
consumers are less familiar with the Groupon merchants. The mean familiarity for the Groupon and
Amazon merchants are 2.0 and 4.5. The difference is statistically significant (t = 13.6, p < 0.01).
Indeed, Groupon tends to attract less known local merchants (Shivendu and Zhang 2013; Edelman
et al. 2014). We report the details of this survey in the Online Appendix.
To help identify the impact of discount on sales, we compiled median household income (in-
come) and the percentage of population aged 25 or above with at least a bachelor degree (education)
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from the 2010 U.S. Census. For IV estimation, we obtained national monthly industry-specific occu-
pational hourly wage estimates for Q1 2014 from Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Current Employment
Statistics (CES). We matched each Groupon subcategory to one industry code in CES.3 The av-
erage hourly wage (AHW ) serves as a proxy for the merchants’ labor costs. We also obtained the
U.S. monthly housing price index (HPI ) in nine census divisions (Pacific, Mountain, West North
Central, West South Central, East North Central, East South Central, New England, Middle At-
lantic, and South Atlantic) in Q1 2014 from the Federal Housing Finance Agency. We matched the
deals to HPI based on their starting dates and the merchants’ locations. HPI serves as a proxy for
the merchants’ rental costs.
Tables 2 and 3 present the summary statistics and correlations of the variables. Figure 1 plots
the distribution of discounts. The mode discount is 50% in our data set. Most merchants offered
at least 30% discount. The 5th percentile is 38.86%.
** Table 2. Summary Statistics **
** Table 3. Correlations **
** Figure 1. Distribution of Discount Percentage **
Figure 2 plots the average hourly sales of deals with different discounts. Panel (a) plots the
sales in the 30th, 40th, 50th, and 60th percentiles of time in each deal’s lifespan. Panel (b) plots the
total sales after the deals have ended. The fitted trends have clear downward slopes, meaning the
sales of the vouchers decreased with discount percentage. Figure 2 provides a model-free overview
of how sales change with the discounts.4
** Figure 2. Deal Sales and Discount Percentage **
3 The CES uses the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). One industry code in CES can match
with multiple Groupon subcategories. For more details on the use of NAICS in CES, see http://www.bls.gov/bls/
naics.htm (accessed 7 March 2017).
4 In both panels, we exclude deals with discounts below the 5th percentile due to limited number of observations.
In Panel (b), we also exclude short and long deals, viz. deals with lifespans below the 20th percentile or above the
80th percentile, to avoid potential confounds due to extremity in deal exposure.
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4. Empirical Model and Results
Our analysis proceeds as follows. First, we establish the causal impact of discount on sales of the
Groupon vouchers by exploiting the wide variation of discounts offered by the deals in our sample.
We strengthen our identification using multiple IV estimators. We further conduct a cluster analysis
and several validation tests to rule out alternative explanations concerning merchant self-selection
to offer discounts. Second, we use multiple empirical strategies to rule out consumers’ concern
on local congestion in using the vouchers as one candidate explanation of the discount impact.
Instead, we pin down quality concern as one plausible explanation of our finding. Third, we test
whether the presence of third-party support, viz. the number of Facebook fans and other online
reviews moderate the discount impact. We then present the evidence from a lab experiment which
corroborates the findings from the empirical analysis using the Groupon data.
Our first analysis uses the following panel fixed-effects model that accounts for other factors
such as price, deal characteristics, and time trends:
ln(Sijt) = β1 ln(discountij) + β2 ln(priceij) + β3 ln(CSij,t−1) + αXij + γj + τt + ijt, (1)
where Sijt denotes the sales of deal i in city j in hour t, discountij denotes the discount percentage
offered by deal i which does not vary over time, priceij denotes deal i’s final transaction (discounted)
price, CSij,t−1 denotes deal i’s cumulative sales up to hour t − 1, Xij is a set of characteristic
variables of deal i, γj captures city-specific effects, τt captures hour-specific effects, and ijt captures
idiosyncratic random errors. We specify all non-index continuous variables in logarithms. As
appropriate, we add one to the variables to avoid logarithm of zero.
Xij includes all the deal characteristics scraped from Groupon as discussed in Section 3. In
addition, we include each deal’s duration (duration). As a proxy variable for the restrictions imposed
on the deals (use restriction proxy), we count the number of characters in the “fine prints”, i.e., the
deals’ detailed terms of use. To account for usage costs, we construct a dummy variable (online
deal) to flag deals with titles containing either “online deal” or “redeem at home”, which do not
require customers to visit the merchants’ physical stores for consumption.
Furthermore, merchants that promote in multiple markets probably enjoy better brand aware-
ness. We include a dummy variable that indicates whether a deal’s merchant operates in multiple
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geographical markets (multi-region deal). Frequency of promotion may also affect consumers’ refer-
ence prices (Lattin and Bucklin 1989) or price sensitivity (Mela et al. 1997). Therefore, we include
a merchant’s frequency of promoting on Groupon in our data window (deal frequency).
Finally, to account for competition within the same geographical market, we include the num-
ber of simultaneously active deals in the same subcategory in the same city (competing deals). We
also include subcategory fixed effects in Xij to account for categorical differences in sales between
different product types. As specified in equation (1), our analysis focuses on explaining the differ-
ences in sales of the deal vouchers within a local market and product subcategory, and from hourly
averages. We cluster the standard errors by product subcategories to allow for demand correlations
across deals in the same subcategories over time.
4.1. Results
Table 2 shows that only a subset of deals have third-party reviews. We first fit equation (1) to all
deals by excluding review count and average rating from Xij . As reported in Table 4, column (1),
the estimates are consistent with our expectation. Price is negatively correlated with sales. The
cumulative sales up to the hour before, which captures unobserved noises such as deal quality, social
influence or diffusion, is positively correlated with sales (Jing and Xie 2011; Hu et al. 2013; Luo
et al. 2014; Subramanian and Rao 2016). More Facebook fans and displaying positive review quotes
increase sales (Li and Wu 2013). By contrast, the number of competing deals negatively affects the
focal deal’s sales. These estimates provide face validity that our empirical model captures the key
considerations in online daily deal sales.
** Table 4. Estimation Results **
Importantly, the coefficient of discount, −0.0195, is negative and precisely estimated (p < 0.01).
With the double-log specification, the elasticity is −0.0352.5 Accordingly, a 1% increase in a deal’s
discount decreases its hourly sales of deal vouchers by 0.0352%. In our data set, the mean discount
offered is 55.6%. Hence, our estimate implies that increasing the discount by 10% from 55.6% could
have reduced hourly sales by 10÷ 55.6× 0.0352× 100% = 0.63% [0.19, 1.08]. This is equivalent to
a decrease in overall sales of 0.80 voucher and $42 in revenue.
5 We correct for the “1” added to the dependent variable in all calculations of elasticities.
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Next, we consider deals with third-party reviews by including the review count, average rating,
and their interaction.6 As shown in Table 4, column (2), the sample size decreases by about two-
thirds. Review count increases the deals’ sales, but average rating does not have a significant impact
on sales. The coefficient of discount, −0.0295, remains negative and statistically significant. This
estimate implies that increasing the discount by 10% from 55.6% could have reduced hourly sales
by 0.96% [0.26, 1.66], or 1.22 vouchers and $64 in revenue in total.
We repeat the estimation in each of the three major product categories: entertainment, beauty
and spas, and restaurants. As shown in Table 4, columns (3)-(5), the effect of discount is always
negative, and it is statistically significant in two of the three categories. In view of the robust
findings in the sub-sample estimates in Table 4, columns (2)-(5), we prefer the estimate obtained
using the whole sample of all 12 categories in Table 4, column (1). The reason is that discount is
a well-understood measure of price promotion that delivers a clear message, viz. the merchants’
willingness to offer price saving, regardless of the original price or product type. We do not have any
a priori reason to isolate or omit any particular product categories. Statistically, our model includes
many deal characteristics and subcategory fixed effects, which helps control for the heterogeneity
in the deals and product categories. Pooling all deals in the estimation should enhance statistical
power without confounding the effect of the discounts.
4.2. Identification
An obvious concern with the above estimation is that the discounts could be endogenous. The
online daily deal merchants might devise discount strategy based on projected consumer demand.
A higher volume of sales may reduce the merchants’ cost margins due to economies of scale, leading
them to offer more discounts in the long run. Unobserved merchant and/or deal characteristics
may also correlate with discount percentage and lead to biased estimates.
We use two IV estimators to strengthen the identification. The first uses the characteristics
of competing products in a differentiated product market as instruments (Berry 1994; Berry et al.
1995; Nevo 2000; Berry and Haile 2014). For each focal deal, the competitors comprise other active
deals in the same category offered by merchants located in the same city. The intuition follows
standard oligopoly pricing models: A product will likely have a low markup above the cost and
6 We mean-center the continuous variables when estimating the interaction effects.
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hence low price (high discount) if it faces good substitutes (Berry 1994; Berry et al. 1995). As
this IV estimator requires consumers to see competing deals as substitutes, we apply it separately
to the restaurant and entertainment deals. Consumers seeking restaurant deals are likely looking
for dining options, meaning other restaurant deals in the same cities are potential substitutes. A
similar consideration applies for consumers seeking entertainment deals.
We treat all deal attributes except sales, price, and discount as exogenous characteristics.
Following Berry et al. (1995), Bresnahan et al. (1997), and Hui (2004), the instruments for deal i’s
discount include (i) all exogenous attributes of deal i and (ii) the sum of exogenous attributes of
deal i’s competitors (active deals in the same category in the same city). We do not instrument for
transaction price because, technically, it is determined by the level of discount offered.7
The IV estimators for the restaurant and entertainment deals are reported in Table 5, columns
(1) and (2). The first-stage R-squares are 0.41 and 0.14, and F statistics are 14.01 (p < 0.01) and
145.10 (p < 0.01). The coefficients of price and discount are consistently negative and larger in
magnitude than the OLS estimators reported in Table 4, columns (3) and (5).8 This is consistent
with previous empirical findings that the price coefficient tends to be more negative in IV estimation
(e.g., Berry et al. 1995; Bresnahan et al. 1997; Hui 2004). The two IV estimators in Table 5, columns
(1) and (2) imply that increasing the discount by 10% from the sample mean could have reduced
sales by 3.32% [1.90, 4.74] or 15.79% [10.06, 21.51].
** Table 5. Identification **
The above IV estimators do not apply to all product categories because it is not easy to define
the competitors for deals in categories such as education or health & fitness. Also, categories such
as nightlife and bars and pets services contain too few deals for separate estimation. Hence, our
second IV estimator uses generic instruments that apply to all product categories. The first such
instrument is AHW, which varies across time and product subcategories. The average wage reflects
merchants’ labor costs. The second instrument is HPI, which varies across time and the nine Census
7 In the Online Appendix, we report the estimation when we instrument for both transaction price and discount.
The result is qualitatively similar.
8 The sample sizes differ across Tables 4 and 5 because, for a small number of deals, we cannot construct the
instruments due to lack of competitors in the same categories and cities.
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Divisions in the United States. HPI reflects merchants’ rental costs. Because we obtained the AHW
and HPI data only for the United States, we exclude all Canada deals from this estimation.
The first-stage R-square and F statistic for this IV estimator are 0.40 and 17.97 (p < 0.01).
Table 5, column (3) reports the second-stage regression result. The coefficient of discount is negative
but not statistically significant (p = 0.11). However, the Hansen J statistic, χ2 = 5.11 (p = 0.02),
shows that at least one of the two instruments is invalid. The first-stage regression coefficients of
AHW and HPI are−0.3940 (p < 0.01) and 0.0019 (p = 0.46), suggesting that HPI is the problematic
instrument. Hence, in Table 5, column (4), we report another IV estimator when AHW is used as
the only instrument. The estimate is very close to the one reported in Table 5, column (3). The
coefficient of discount is statistically significant at the 10% level (p = 0.09).9 This estimator implies
that increasing the discount by 10% from the sample mean of 55.6% could have reduced hourly
sales by 2.11% [−0.32, 4.54], or 2.69 vouchers and $141 in revenue in total.
4.3. Competing Explanation
One explanation of the negative discount effect on sales is that there could be self-selection, i.e.,
merchants choose discount levels based on their expected sales. Merchants who are confident in
sales, perhaps due to higher quality or popularity, may offer lower discounts. This would empirically
give rise to a negative correlation between discount and sales, but the change in sales would not
be caused by the variation in discounts. Self-selection is not likely the explanation in our setting
because merchants on online daily deal websites are often less well known to consumers (Dholakia
and Kimes 2011; Wang et al. 2013; Luo et al. 2014). It would be challenging for the merchants to
gauge their sales potential among unfamiliar consumers. As described in Section 3, we have con-
ducted a survey to assess consumers’ familiarity with Groupon merchants and, indeed, consumers
are less familiar with the merchants on Groupon than those on Amazon.com. In addition, the IV
estimators in Table 5 should also address selection bias.
Nevertheless, to critically assess the self-selection explanation, we conduct a cluster analysis
that divides the 19,978 deals into separate groups based on the deals’ characteristics. Because the
deals have both qualitative and quantitative attributes, we use Gower’s distance measure (Gower
9 The power of the IV estimators in Table 5, columns (3) and (4) is low because AHW and HPI vary only by city
and product subcategory but not by deal. There may not be enough variation to precisely identify the discount
impact. We report the first-stage regression results in the Online Appendix.
14
1971) and the K -medoids algorithm (Friedman et al. 2001) to cluster the deals.10 We select the
number of clusters, K, by comparing the average silhouette value (Rousseeuw 1987) for each K ∈
{2, 3, . . . , 10}.11 The highest average silhouette value is obtained when K = 2, i.e., the deals are
best grouped into two clusters, one including 13,203 deals and the other including 6,775 deals. The
deals in the second cluster have more Facebook fans and longer time to expire, allow for larger
purchase quantities, and are more often offered in multiple cities when compared with the deals in
the first cluster. They are more likely sold out too. Please refer to the details of the two clusters of
deals in the Online Appendix. These characteristic differences suggest that the deals in the second
cluster are more popular and enjoy more exposure than the deals in the first cluster.
Based on the cluster analysis results, we create a new dummy variable, popular deals, that
indicates whether a deal falls in the “popular” cluster. We add popular deals and popular deals ×
discount to the regression. If merchant self-selection drives the negative discount effect, then we
expect the discount effect to be weaker among popular deals, meaning popular deals × discount
should positively correlate with sales. As reported in Table 5, column (5), this is not the case. The
coefficient of popular deals × discount is negative and statistically insignificant. The coefficient of
discount, −0.0185 (p < 0.05), continues to be negative and statistically significant, meaning the
negative discount effect applies to all merchants with different popularity. In fact, combining the
main and interaction effects, discount has an even more negative effect, −0.0203 (p < 0.05), on
sales among the popular deals.
We use two additional strategies to test the merchant self-selection explanation.12 First, if the
merchants offered discounts based on expected sales, then the discount effect should diminish as the
level of sales increases – presumably, deals with higher sales should be less affected if the discount
effect found above is spurious. On this basis, we compare the effects of discount at the lower quartile,
median, and upper quartile of merchants (defined by final deal sales) using a quantile regression.
10 The K -medoids algorithm is similar to the widely-used K -means algorithm, except that it can also be applied
to categorical data. We provide more discussion about Gower’s distance, the K -medoids algorithm, and additional
details of our cluster analysis in the Online Appendix.
11 The silhouette value measures the similarity of an object with its own cluster as compared with other clusters. It
ranges from −1 to 1. A higher silhouette value indicates that the object is well matched to its own cluster and poorly
matched to neighboring clusters.
12 We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting these two tests.
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We find that the discount effect is negative and statistically significant among the median and
upper-quartile merchants, but it is statistically insignificant among the lower-quartile merchants.
The effect is not statistically different among the median and upper-quartile merchants. These
findings go against the explanation of merchant self-selection to offer discounts by sales. Please
refer to the Online Appendix for the details of this quantile regression.
Second, we carry out another estimation that considers discount as a continuous and endoge-
nous treatment variable to account for potential selectivity bias (Garen 1984). As reported in the
Online Appendix, the result does not indicate the presence of selectivity bias. The discount effect
continues to be negative and statistically significant after incorporating the bias correction terms.
Once again, this implies that merchant self-selection to offer discounts is not a potent explanation
to the negative discount impact on the daily deal sales.
4.4. Consumption Congestion
Groupon carries many deals for local services such as dining, spa, and education that often have
capacity constraints and hence are prone to consumption congestion. One possible explanation of
the negative discount effect is that consumers may fear the heavily-discounted deals could attract
too many purchases that lead to congestion later when they try to redeem the purchased vouchers.
We test this explanation with three empirical strategies in this section.
First, we include an interaction term, days before expiration × discount, and re-estimate equa-
tion (1). Having fewer days before the vouchers expire should arouse a stronger concern on con-
sumption congestion because consumers will have less time to redeem the voucher. If congestion
concern is the explanation, then we expect days before expiration to attenuate the negative discount
effect, i.e., days before expiration × discount should positively correlate with sales. As reported in
Table 6, column (1), this is not the case. The coefficient of days before expiration × discount is
negative instead of positive, and statistically significant.
** Table 6. Tests of Candidate Explanations **
Second, we identify subcategories of deals that are not likely affected by congestion at the
time of consumption. These include deals involving take-away products or self-services, viz. those
in Food & Drinks, Auto Parts & Accessories (Automotive Services), Beauty Products (Beauty
& Spas), Magazine Subscription (Professional Services), and Self-Storage (Professional Services),
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and deals that will not likely encounter congestion because of large service capacity, viz. those
in Amusement Park (Entertainment), Aquariums (Entertainment), Botanical Garden (Entertain-
ment), Museum (Entertainment), Water Park (Entertainment), and Zoos (Entertainment). We
repeat the estimation using this sub-sample of “non-congestive” deals. If the concern on local con-
gestion causes our finding, then the negative effect of discount should be smaller in this sub-sample.
As reported in Table 6, column (2), this is not the case. The coefficient of discount is negative,
−0.0382 (p < 0.05), and more negative than our baseline estimate in Table 4, column (1).
Third, we examine how the discount effect varies over the deals’ life cycle. We construct a new
variable, progress, that equals the amount of time that a deal has elapsed over the deal’s total
lifespan. We include progress and progress×discount in the regression. If consumers are concerned
about consumption congestion, then the negative discount effect should be more pronounced as a
deal progresses and the sales are gradually built up. Table 6, column (3) reports the estimation
result. The coefficient of progress× discount is positive and statistically significant, implying the
negative effect of discount is attenuated as a deal progresses to the later stage in its life cycle. This
finding goes against the consumption congestion explanation.
Figure 3 plots the deals’ sales against discount percentage at the lower quartile, median, and
upper quartile of deal completion time. As indicated by the fitted trends, the negative discount
effect is robust across merchants during different stage of the deals’ sales, but it seems slightly
smaller (i.e., the slopes of the fitted trends become less steep) when the sales is closer to completion.
Overall, the evidence in Table 6, columns (1)-(3) and Figure 3 does not support the concern on
consumption congestion explanation.
** Figure 3. Discount Effects over Deal Life Cycle **
4.5. The Quality Concern Explanation
Why would discount reduce sales of online daily deals? Prior research on online commerce suggests
that information asymmetry could cause consumers to use price as a quality signal (Overby and
Jap 2009; Kim and Krishnan 2015). When the discount is large, consumers may perceive that the
product quality is low (Rao 2005). Ample experimental evidence has shown that such price-quality
association exists in the presence of quality uncertainty (Rao and Monroe 1989).
In the online daily deal setting, because consumers usually do not consume the purchased items
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immediately, there is an added concern that the merchants could cheat on quality (e.g., use poor
ingredients in restaurants or low quality aromatherapy oils in massage). There is indeed qualitative
evidence that consumers of daily deal websites are uncertain about deal quality and so do not
blindly pursue deeply discounted items (Dholakia and Kimes 2011; Wang et al. 2013).
We apply three empirical strategies to test whether the quality concern explanation is tenable.
These strategies are founded on a priori reasoning that predicts the discount impact to vary in a
specific direction if quality concern is the underlying causal mechanism.
The first strategy considers whether the deals involve credence goods. Typical examples of
credence goods include medical treatment, automotive repair, and expert services (Darby and
Karni 1973; Emons 1997; Dulleck and Kerschbamer 2006). Following Dulleck et al. (2011), we also
consider health and organic food as credence goods. Unlike search and experience goods, the quality
of credence goods is difficult to ascertain even after consumption without the relevant knowledge.
Hence, consumers often have to rely on the merchants’ claims to appraise the products. If quality
concern underlies the negative discount effect, then we expect the effect to be larger among credence
goods deals, which allow merchants to cheat on quality more easily.
We classify the Groupon deals into experience goods and credence goods based on the difficulty
in assessing their quality after consumption.13 We cross-checked our classification with independent
judgments made by five trained PhD students and survey responses from 43 randomly-selected U.S.
residents. The results show that our classification is valid, in the sense that it successfully separates
deals that differ in terms of the difficulty in assessing the products’ quality after consumption. We
report the classification and verification results in the Online Appendix.
We use a dummy variable, credence, to flag the subcategories of credence goods deals. We
add credence and its interaction with discount to the regression. Note that we cannot separately
estimate the effect of credence because it is collinear with the subcategory fixed effects.
Table 6, column (4) reports the results. The coefficient of discount continues to be negative
and precisely estimated. Importantly for our identification strategy, the coefficient of credence ×
discount is −0.0696 and statistically significant (p < 0.05), implying discount reduces sales partic-
ularly for credence goods. This is consistent with the quality concern expectation. This estimate
13 Table A.1 in the Online Appendix lists the subcategories that we consider as credence goods.
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implies that increasing the discount by 10% from the sample mean could have reduced sales by an
additional 2.26% [0.08, 4.44] if the deal involves a credence good (cf. experience goods). This is
equivalent to 2.88 vouchers and $151 in revenue in total.
Our second strategy utilizes an insight from prior analysis of online daily deals, which suggests
that displaying the number of previous purchases reduces consumers’ quality concern because of
observational learning (Hu et al. 2013; Li and Wu 2013; Luo et al. 2014; Subramanian and Rao
2016). Groupon displays the number of purchases for all deals that it carries on a real-time basis.
Accordingly, we construct a new dummy variable, SalesAboveThreshold, that indicates whether a
deal’s sales exceeds a selected threshold in each time period. We then add this new variable and
its interaction with discount to the regression.
Referring to Table 2, the average lagged cumulative sales in our data set is 76. Hence, we choose
300, which is considerably bigger than 76, as the threshold. Deals that have achieved this threshold
are more likely to benefit from observational learning. As reported in the Online Appendix, the
estimation result is robust if we change this threshold to 200 or 400.
Table 6, column (5) reports the estimation results. Consistent with the presence of observa-
tional learning, the coefficient of SalesAboveThreshold is positive and precisely estimated. Impor-
tantly for our identification strategy, the coefficient of SalesAboveThreshold×discount is positive,
0.0479, and statistically significant (p < 0.01). This means the negative discount effect is weaker
for well-sold deals, supporting our interpretation that the discount is used as a negative quality
signal when uncertainty is high (i.e., for deals that do not meet the threshold).14
Our third empirical strategy exploits the preferences of people with different socioeconomic
status. In particular, income and education may moderate a consumer’s quality preference and
attitude toward uncertainty. Wealthier consumers tend to have lower marginal utility of income or,
equivalently, a taste for higher quality (Schaninger 1993; Tirole 1988, pp. 96-97). This implies that
14 Unlike the test in Table 6, column (5) which uses a sales threshold to separate the deals, the test reported in
Table 5, column (5) separates the deals by popularity as defined by a cluster analysis of the deal characteristics. The
“popular” deals there need not have more sales. In fact, among the 6,775 “popular” deals as classified in Section 4.3,
only 1,107 (16.34%) meet the threshold of selling at least 300 vouchers. The result in Table 6, column (5) is consistent
with that in Table 6, column (3), which shows that the discount effect is attenuated as sales progresses. Note, also,
that the tests reported in Table 6, columns (3) and (5) focus on the sales progress within a deal, whereas the cluster
analysis and quantile regression reported in Section 4.3 (to test the competing explanation of merchant self-selection
to offer discount by popularity or sales) focus on between-merchant differences.
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high-income consumers are less sensitive to price, less tolerant of poor quality, and more averse to
uncertainty. Similarly, better-educated consumers may have a stronger preference for quality as is
the case in the consumption of organic food (e.g., Jolly 1991; Magnusson et al. 2001). They are
also more experienced with Internet purchases (Li et al. 1999) and hence should be more aware of
the threats posed by asymmetric information and fraudulent seller behavior.
Accordingly, if discount arouses quality concern, then its effect should be stronger among high-
income and better-educated consumers. On this basis, we enter the interaction between income
and discount and the interaction between education and discount in the next two regressions. We
measure income by median household income and education by the percentage of population aged
25 or above with at least a bachelor degree from U.S. Census 2010. The results are reported in
Table 6, columns (6) and (7). Note that we cannot obtain the main effects of income and education
because they are collinear with the city fixed effects. We use only the U.S. deals in this test because
we only have the U.S. demographic data.
As expected, the coefficients of income × discount and education × discount are negative,
−0.0593 and −0.0410, and statistically significant at p < 0.01. The negative effect of discount is
particularly pronounced among consumers with high income and better education. Once again, this
is consistent with the interpretation that quality concern is driving the negative impact of discount
on sales of the daily deal vouchers.
4.6. Falsification and Robustness Checks
We conduct a falsification exercise to show that the negative discount effect ceases to exist when
quality concern is supposed to be absent. Specifically, we collected a fresh sample of Groupon Goods,
which is a relatively new category of deals launched in 2011. For these deals, Groupon acts as the
retailer and promotes mostly search goods such as electronics, toys, apparels, etc. Because Groupon
goods are directly sold by Groupon instead of other third parties and can be freely returned within
14 days of delivery, consumers should have less concern on their quality.15 Hence, we expect the
negative effect of discount to be less salient for Groupon Goods.
We collected 382 deals of Groupon Goods from 8 January to 31 March 2014. We follow the
15 For more details on Groupon’s return policy, please visit https://www.groupon.com/faq#faqs:content-104 (ac-
cessed 15 March 2017).
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same procedures as described in Section 3 to compile the data and re-estimate equation (1). We
omit several variables, such as merchant-created deal or online deal, because they do not apply to
this sample (Groupon created all of these deals through its home delivery service). Table 7 reports
the descriptive statistics of the Groupon Goods sample.
** Table 7. Descriptive Statistics: Groupon Goods **
The estimation results are reported in Table 8, column (1). In sharp contrast to Table 4, column
(1), the coefficient of discount becomes positive, 0.3714, and is precisely estimated (p < 0.01). When
quality uncertainty is eased, discount can actually increase daily deal sales. This falsification test
provides powerful support to our interpretation that the negative impact of discount identified in
this study is caused by consumers’ quality concern.
** Table 8. Falsification and Robustness Tests **
We next conduct several robustness tests. First, we use the final sales after the deals were
concluded instead of hourly sales as the dependent variable. The sample then comprises a cross-
section of 19,978 deals without the time-varying covariates such as lagged cumulative sales.16 Table
8, column (2) reports the estimation result. Consistent with the panel estimates, the coefficient of
discount is negative, −0.1415, and statistically significant (p < 0.01). This estimate implies that
offering an additional 10% discount from the sample mean of 55.6% could have reduced total sales
by 4.60% [2.85, 6.35], or 5.24 vouchers and $275 in revenue.
Despite the consistent estimates, we prefer using the panel structure of our data set because it
allows us to model the dynamics in deal sales. For example, with an hourly panel, we can include
lagged cumulative sales as a control variable to account for unobserved deal quality and social
influence and diffusion effects. Furthermore, we can calibrate the number of competing deals by
hour with a panel. These features should help increase the power of our identification.
Second, to more specifically control for deal heterogeneity, we use a random effects (RE) model
which allows us to estimate the coefficients of the time-invariant variables, including discount and
16 We calculate the number of competing deals as the total number of deals that overlapped with the focal deal
during its lifespan. Because we cannot include time fixed effects in this specification, we add a new variable, holiday
percentage, to measure the percentage of weekends and public holidays in a deal’s lifespan to control for heterogeneous
propensity of online daily deal purchases.
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the other deal characteristics. As reported in Table 8, column (3), the result is qualitatively similar.
The effect of discount on sales is negative, −0.0270, and statistically significant (p < 0.05). Note,
however, that the RE model imposes a strong assumption, that the random deal effects are not
correlated with the observed deal characteristics. This assumption is unlikely to hold in the online
daily deal setting. Indeed, the Hausman test rejects this assumption (χ2 = 1811.92, p < 0.01).
Hence, we prefer the estimation in Table 4, column (1) to the RE model.
Third, we estimate a linear version of equation (1). As reported in Table 8, column (4), the
discount effect is −0.0045 and statistically significant (p < 0.05). This estimate implies that offering
an additional discount of 10% from the sample mean could have reduced hourly sales by 3.63% [0.31,
6.95]. This estimate is bigger than the one reported in Table 4, column (1). However, the linear
specification does not fit the data as well as the double log specification.
Fourth, to allow for flexible social influence and diffusion effects, we estimate another specifi-
cation that includes the square of lagged cumulative sales as an additional covariate. The result
is reported in Table 8, column (5). The relationship between lagged cumulative sales and current
period sales is convex, suggesting that sales could be self-reinforcing when the volume is large. The
coefficient of discount continues to be negative and statistically significant.
We check the robustness to exclusion of outliers in the last two tests. One excludes deals
with original price below the 20th or above the 80th percentiles, which prunes the price variation
from $5–$12,582 to $30–$165. To the extent that unobserved deal characteristics correlate with
price, this procedure helps ensure that our results are not caused by omitted characteristics of some
extreme deals. Similarly, in the second test, we exclude outliers in terms of duration by discarding
deals with durations below the 20th or above the 80th percentiles, which reduces the range from
12–926 to 93–97 hours. As reported in Table 8, columns (6) and (7), the negative effect of discount
is robust to exclusion of outliers in terms of price and duration.17
17 We have conducted additional robustness tests. In the first test, we exclude deals with extreme transaction prices.
In the second test, we include linear and quadratic time trends in the regression. In the third and fourth tests,
we include day-specific city fixed effects and day-specific subcategory fixed effects. In the fifth test, we cluster the
standard errors by deal instead of product subcategory. We find that the discount effect is consistently negative
and statistically significant in all of these tests. Please refer to Table A.8 in the Online Appendix for the detailed
estimation results. Moreover, we apply the dynamic generalized method of moment (GMM) estimator (Arellano
and Bond 1991) and do not find any evidence of auto-correlation in our data. Note that we cannot use the GMM
estimator for our main estimation as the discounts do not change within the lifespan of the deals.
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4.7. Third-Party Support from Online Social Networks
Groupon provides merchants with an option to selectively display third-party support from other
social networks, viz. the number of Facebook fans and review quotes, and counts and rating from
Yelp, Yahoo! and Google. The results in Table 4 show that the number of Facebook fans and
customers’ reviews help increase online daily deal sales. This raises an interesting question: Can
such third-party support thwart the negative quality signal delivered by the discount?
We answer this question with several tests. We add the interactions between discount and the
number of Facebook fans and a dummy variable indicating whether a deal page displays customers’
review quotes in the regression. As reported in Table 9, column (1), both of these two interaction
effects are negative and statistically significant, implying the negative effect of discount on sales is
exacerbated in the presence of third-party support.
** Table 9. Impact of Third-Party Support **
Another indication of third-party support is the quality of online reviews. In the next test, we
use the sub-sample of deals with online reviews and include the interactions between discount and
review count and review rating in the regression. As reported in Table 9, column (2), both interac-
tion effects are negative but not statistically significant. However, prior research has suggested that
consumers may not take online reviews seriously when the number of reviews is small (Li and Wu
2013). In Table 9, column (3), we repeat the same regression by confining the sample to 3,501 deals
that have at least 30 online third-party reviews. Both review count and review rating significantly
exacerbate the negative effect of discount on sales.
One concern of these estimates is that the display of third-party support could be endogenous.
Low quality merchants tend to offer more discounts and at the same time manipulate the support,
which may induce less trust and hence lower sales. We use propensity score matching (PSM) to
identify a sample of “control” deals (without third-party reviews) that match with the “treated”
deals (with third-party reviews) in characteristics. We use one-to-one nearest neighbor matching
without replacement and an appropriate caliper to balance all covariates between the treated group
and control group. We have successfully identified 4,184 pairs of matched deals, the details of
which are reported in the Online Appendix. Table 9, column (4) reports the estimation using this
matched sample. The result is qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 4, column (1). We
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then add the interactions between discount and the number of Facebook fans and the review quote
dummy variable in the next regression. As reported in Table 9, column (5), both interaction effects
are negative and the one with review quote is statistically significant (p < 0.01).
Overall, the estimates in Tables 4 and 9 point to a converging conclusion: Third-party support
from other online social networks can improve sales but exacerbate the negative effect of discount.
The net effect of third-party support is contingent on the level of discount offered.18
In general, favorable third-party support should “reinforce” the prices charged by merchants,
making consumers more likely to accept high prices. Hence, it is not surprising that it helps increase
sales. Referring to Table 9, the main effects of the third-party support are mostly positive, meaning
it increases sales when discount is low. However, why would it decrease sales when the discount is
large (i.e., when the price is low)? If third-party support helps convince consumers that a deal is
good, why would consumers dislike a high discount that saves them money?
Previous experimental evidence provides a useful hint. When consumers see inconsistent qual-
ity signals, negativity bias may cause them to anchor on the negative signal (Boulding and Kirmani
1993; Smith and Vogt 1995; Miyazaki et al. 2005). In our setting, the merchants display third-party
support as a positive quality cue, but a big discount may send a (dominating) negative signal, which
could cause consumers to refrain from purchasing the deals.
Another related explanation is consumers’ distrust in the merchants’ selection of third-party
support. They may fear that merchants could manipulate the third-party support to create biased
impressions (Dellarocas 2006; Jin and Kato 2006; Mayzlin 2006; Li and Hitt 2008; Filan 2012;
Mayzlin et al. 2014). This is especially likely when consumers are not familiar with the daily deal
merchants. In the presence of negativity bias due to discount and absence of familiarity and trust
on merchants, consumers may suspect that the merchants need third-party support and offer large
18 Note that, referring to the cluster analysis in Section 4.3 and the Online Appendix, deals in the “popular” cluster
also have more Facebook fans. However, that cluster analysis utilizes all available deal characteristics to segment the
deals. Hence, it identifies the latent “popularity” of the deals instead of third-party support per se. This explains
why the interaction effect between popular deals and discount in Table 5, column (5) is insignificant whereas the
interaction effects between third-party support and discount are mostly negative and statistically significant in Table
9. To check the robustness of the results in Table 9, we conduct another cluster analysis using only two variables,
Facebook fans and has review quotes. The result shows that the clustering of the deals is completely different from the
cluster analysis reported in Section 4.3, with the deals now optimally separated into two clusters by the has review
quotes variable alone. This indicates that the cluster analysis reported in Section 4.3 does not focus on third-party
support. Please refer to the Online Appendix for the details of this cluster analysis.
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discounts at the same time because their product quality is low. This may explain why the discount
effect is more negative when third-party support is high.
Indeed, Groupon cautions consumers:
“Descriptions of the merchant offerings and products advertised on the site are provided
by the merchant or other referenced third parties. Groupon does not investigate or vet
merchants.”19
To explore whether consumer trust (or lack of trust) of the reviews underscores our findings, we
conducted another survey on 50 randomly-selected U.S. residents. We found suggestive evidence
that people place less trust in the reviews displayed on Groupon’s deal pages than the reviews from
Yelp. We report the details of this survey in the Online Appendix.
5. Lab Experiment
We conducted a lab experiment to corroborate the empirical analysis of the field data from Groupon.
The purpose of this experiment is two-fold. First, we directly test the quality concern explanation by
systematically manipulating the discount levels and measuring consumers’ perceptions of product
quality. Second, because the distribution of discount in the Groupon data is skewed (see Figure 1),
we test the robustness of its effect on sales along a broader range of discounts.
We created 19 different deals featuring products and services chosen from various product
subcategories that best capture the distribution of deals in our field data set obtained from Groupon.
For each of these 19 deals, we manipulated the discount levels in increments of 5%. Hence, we
created 19 treatment groups for each deal offering discounts of 5%, 10%, 15%, . . . , 95%. The 19
versions of each deal are identical in appearance and all displayed attributes except the discounts
offered. We provide a sample deal page in the Online Appendix.
We presented each subject with 19 deal pages. We counter-balanced the presentation of deals
so that each subject will see all 19 different deals and all 19 discount percentages. This is to ensure
that the subjects cannot infer the purpose of the experiment by seeing repetitive deals or discounts.
We randomized the presentation sequence of the deals and discounts to avoid any ordering effect.
Before presenting each deal, we asked the subjects to imagine a scenario when they are considering
19 See Groupon’s Terms of Sale: https://www.groupon.com/pages/terms-of-sale (accessed 15 March 2015).
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the products or services carried by the deal. After seeing each of the 19 deals, we asked the subjects
to respond to three statements on 7-point Likert scales: (1)“I am uncertain about the overall quality
of the ... shown in the deal.” (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). (2) “The overall quality
of the ... shown in the deal is high.” (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). (3) “How likely
will you purchase this deal?” (1 = extremely unlikely, 7 = extremely likely).
We recruited 217 undergraduate and postgraduate students in a large European university
to participate in the experiment. Because each subject evaluated 19 deals, we have a total of
217 × 19 = 4123 observations. Figure 4 plots the average perceived quality uncertainty, perceived
quality, and willingness-to-buy (WTB) against discount percentage. Evidently, there exist some
thresholds. The perceived quality uncertainty increases rapidly after the discount exceeds 60%.
Similar trends exist for perceived quality and WTB. The perceived quality starts to decrease and
WTB ceases to increase after the discount exceeds around 60%.
** Figure 4. Perceived Quality Uncertainty, Perceived Quality, and WTB **
We conduct piecewise regressions on the experimental data to examine the non-linear effect of
discount. Specifically, we incorporate a “breakpoint” and allow the discount effect to change before
and after the breakpoint. Guided by the patterns in Figure 4, we choose 60% as the breakpoint. We
show that the results are robust if we use 50% or 55% as the breakpoint in the Online Appendix.
We include deal, subject, and order fixed effects in these regressions. We cluster the standard errors
by subject to allow for correlations in rating by the same subject.
Table 10 presents the regression results using the experimental data. For perceived quality
uncertainty, the coefficient of discount is not statistically significant when the discount is below
60%, but it is positive and statistically significant when the discount is 60% or above. Similarly,
the effect of discount on perceived quality is negative and statistically significant only when the
discount is 60% or above. Discount has a significant positive effect on WTB only when it is below
60%. The WTB does not change after the discount has reached 60%.
** Table 10. Threshold Effect of Discount **
These results triangulate our findings from the empirical analysis of the Groupon data. Because
we systematically manipulated the discount levels and measured the subjects’ quality perceptions,
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the experimental results provide a high level of confidence that the effect of discount on quality
concern is causal. We also find that quality concern arises only when the discount exceeds some
threshold. This implies that a moderate level of discount can help attract consumers (Alba et al.
1999). Indeed, we find that discount increases the subjects’ WTB when it is not too high (say, 60%
or below). To our knowledge, this threshold effect of discount is novel.
We conclude this section by highlighting several limitations of the experiment. All subjects are
university students who may have different price-response functions when compared with working
adults. We captured the subjects’ responses by a questionnaire, which may lead to bias because
stated preferences are often different from revealed preferences (see, e.g., Bishop and Heberlein
1979; Diamond et al. 1993; Diamond and Hausman 1994). The subjects could have inflated their
WTB because they do not need to pay real money in the experiment, which may explain why their
WTB stays high even for deals offering discounts above 60%. This is somewhat different from our
empirical findings where large discounts tend to decrease sales (see Figure 2).
Nevertheless, despite these limitations due to the experimental setting, our results point to a
consistent picture – high discount arouses quality concern and could affect peoples’ appraisal and
purchase of online daily deals.
6. Implications and Conclusion
By conducting a series of statistical analysis, we show that discount has an immediate negative
effect on the sales of online daily deals. Our various estimates suggest that offering an additional
10% discount from the average of 55.6% could reduce sales by 0.63–4.60%, or 0.80–5.24 vouchers
and $42–$275 in revenue. This effect is economically significant because many online daily deals
are offered by local businesses (Shivendu and Zhang 2013; Edelman et al. 2014). Our finding echoes
recent statistics showing an adverse effect of deep discounts on sales (Dror 2014).
More importantly, this finding questions the tactic of using discount to attract new customers
in the online daily deal business model. As shown in Figure 1, many merchants on Groupon offer
big discounts, some even exceeding 80%. The merchants may hope to use such big discounts to
catch consumer attention and increase exposure to consumers by, for example, attracting consumers
to visit their stores and make other purchases in the future. It defeats the merchants’ promotional
purposes if the discounts drive consumers away instead of attracting them to the merchants’ stores.
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The discounts could also undermine the merchants’ advertising objective if it is viewed as a signal
of poor quality, which may dampen the merchants’ quality image. Apparently, consumers use daily
deals to discover novel items with “good value for money” around their local regions instead of
pursuing price saving per se (Dholakia and Kimes 2011; Wang et al. 2013).
We find robust and triangulated evidence that the negative discount effect on sales is caused
by consumers’ quality concern. An immediate question is: How can a merchant ease such quality
concern? One obvious way is to confine the discounts offered. However, this does not seem to be a
good solution because it is not targeted. As shown in Sections 4.6 and 5, discount can help attract
consumers for Groupon goods and when it does not exceed some thresholds. Hence, a good solution
should address the root of the problem, i.e., concern on product quality.
The analysis of Groupon goods in Section 4.6 and Table 8, column (1) provides useful insights.
The discounts increase sales when the deals are carried by Groupon with a guaranteed return policy.
Hence, a two-prong approach may help. First, the platform provider can establish a league of
“trustworthy” merchants, much like the T-Mall feature provided by Taobao.com, one of the biggest
platforms for business-to-consumer electronic commerce. Conceptually, this practice is akin to
notarizing online daily deal merchants. Prior research suggests that notarization of online retailers
through a third-party quality assurance seal helps increase consumer purchases (Ozpolat et al.
2013). Second, online daily deal merchants can make better use of return policies, which directly
reduce consumers’ risks of getting low quality products. Properly-configured return policies can
serve as a quality signal too (Bonifield et al. 2010; Zhang et al. forthcoming).
As shown in Table 6, column (5), another setting for discount to help is when the daily deal has
reached a high level of sales. This finding is strikingly consistent with previous theoretical analysis
(Jing and Xie 2011; Hu et al. 2013; Subramanian and Rao 2016). Interestingly, in the early days,
Groupon required a “tipping point”, i.e., minimum number of purchases, for some deals before they
can be established. With such a requirement, informed consumers would have more incentive to
promote the deals for merchants offering high quality products to uninformed consumers. This
unique social interaction distinguishes the early group buying model from general online retailing.
However, as Groupon migrated to the online daily deal model, it dropped this minimum purchase
requirement. Perhaps it is advisable for Groupon, or other online marketplaces featuring less known
sellers, to re-instate the minimum purchase requirement.
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Previous research suggests that third-party reviews can help ease consumers’ quality concern
in online commerce (Dellarocas et al. 2007). The analysis in Section 4.7 and Table 9, however,
shows that such third-party support is a two-edged sword. It can help increase sales by itself, but
it may decrease sales when coupled with high discounts. This is a novel and important finding that
corroborates prior work on the quality signaling effect of online reviews (Forman et al. 2008; Zhu
and Zhang 2010; Ho-Dac et al. 2013). We do not have concrete evidence to explain why third-
party support is bad in the presence of deep discounts, but we speculate that it could have raised
consumers’ suspicion on product quality when the discount serves as a negative quality signal. This
may be especially the case when most online daily deal merchants are not well known to consumers,
and when they can selectively curate such third-party support.
Incidentally, after restructuring its website in 2015, Groupon has ceased displaying any third-
party support on the deals’ pages. Instead, it now shows recommendations and comments from
Groupon users who have prior experience with the specific merchants. Our findings support this
restructuring. More broadly, this study advances an intricate nuance in displaying peripheral
information. In the presence of a negative quality signal such as discount, an ostensibly positive
signal such as favorable third-party support may turn to become a curse when some other quality
signals such as sales volume may help. Future research should scrutinize the mechanisms underlying
these intriguing interactions between different quality signals in an online market.
One practical implication of this research is that the offering of discounts should be tied to
consumers’ confidence in product quality, meaning a one-size-fits-all strategy will not be optimal.
Indeed, as shown in Table 6, column (5) and Table 8, column (1), offering high discounts work well
for Groupon goods and well-sold deals. Hence, the key is to assess the deals’ quality and credibility.
Obviously, the platform provider would not know the deals better than the offering merchants.
Lacking guidance on how to assess deal quality, perhaps the platform provider can offer a “price
menu” to encourage responsible pricing and discount strategy by merchants. For example, it can
peg the revenue-sharing percentage with the discount proposed by merchants, such as 10% revenue
sharing for deals offering 20% discount, 30% for deals offering 40% discount, 50% for deals offering
discounts above 60%, and so on. This incentivizes merchants to avoid offering suspiciously deep
discounts unless they can be sure that their deals are going to sell well.
On the other hand, merchants could proactively preempt consumers’ concern about discounted
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products. Our analysis provides several specific guidance. First, sellers of credence goods, such
as expert services or health and organic foods, should avoid offering deep discounts because such
discounts arouse consumers’ suspicion. Second, discounts may be helpful when the deal has acquired
more buyers. This implies that merchants may want to work with the platform provider to facilitate
flexible discount structures, such as volume-based discounting. For example, a merchant can offer a
discount of 10% when the sales is less than 50, 20% when the sales exceeds 50, 30% when the sales
exceeds 100, and so on. Third, merchants should consider the location or market. Discounts may
not attract high-income or better-educated consumers. Hence, the extent of discounts in daily deals
should be defined with the population demographics in mind. Fourth, merchants should carefully
assess the quality signals carried by their marketing tactics. Adding a non-credible positive signal,
such as curated online third-party support, may fail to boost consumer confidence. Worse still, it
may aggravate the negative impression due to other signals, such as discounts.
In terms of research, our findings offer an alternative perspective to price promotion. Previous
research has generally agreed that “temporary retail price promotions cause a significant short-term
sales spike ... this result is fundamental to virtually all research done in the area of promotions”
(Blattberg et al. 1995, p. G123). Although some researchers have advocated the negative long-
term effects of price promotion (Lattin and Bucklin 1989; Mela et al. 1997, 1998; Jedidi et al. 1999;
Erdem et al. 2008), we show that the negative effect can come immediately, deterring even some
consumers’ first purchases. This is an important caution to marketing managers.
Furthermore, we demonstrate that displaying more Facebook fans and review quotes, and
better review count and rating from third-party websites could hurt a merchant. We need to
expand theoretical research in online third-party support to provide a holistic understanding of its
effects. This is imminent when social network or social media marketing is gaining momentum and
harvesting Facebook “likes” or Twitter “follows” has become important marketing tactics.
Last but not least, although we derive our findings from the online daily deal setting, we believe
our insights extend to general markets involving small and less known sellers (e.g., consumer-to-
consumer trading platforms, online search advertising). The key considerations are quality uncer-
tainty, seller credibility, and the interplay between different product signals, which are predominant
in almost all online marketplaces featuring heterogeneous products.
We conclude the paper by identifying several research opportunities. First, as shown in the lab
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experiment, the effect of discount is non-linear. Low discounts may work well without provoking
consumer suspicion. A good topic for future research is to explore the optimal discount strategy.
Although our experiment suggests that the discount threshold is around 60%, we hesitate in gen-
eralizing this result because it is derived from a lab experiment. After all, our field data show that
discount starts to decrease sales at 40%, and another large-scale field study has suggested the best
discount to lie between 5% and 15% (Dror 2014). Evidently, we need a more general framework to
guide the discount strategy in different online markets.
Second, our data set confines us to studying the immediate effect of discount, viz. its influence
on daily deal sales. The effect of daily deal promotion could linger even after the promotional
campaign has finished. Future research should go beyond deal sales and scrutinize the long-term
impact of online daily deal promotions. This would require comprehensive data covering online
daily deal purchases as well as the merchants’ subsequent engagement with the customers. On this
front, individual-level longitudinal data, such as the ones collected via mobile phone app usage in
Luo et al. (2014), would be highly valuable.
Finally, it would be interesting to extend our analysis to other platforms that involve “pricing”,
such as micro-finance, peer-to-peer lending (for which excessive interest rates may raise suspicion
from investors), or crowd-funding projects (for which low pledge amounts may cause consumers to
worry that the project may not succeed). Guided by the insights from our analysis, we suspect
heavy “discounting” may also arouse consumers’ concerns in these settings.
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Figure 4. Perceived Quality Uncertainty, Perceived Quality, and WTB 
        
 
Table 1. Deal Distribution 
Category Freq. Percent 
Cum. 
percent 
Automotive 271 1.36 1.36 
Beauty & Spas 5,230 26.18 27.54 
Education 691 3.46 30.99 
Entertainment 6,524 32.66 63.65 
Food & Drink 620 3.10 66.75 
Health & Fitness 1,804 9.03 75.78 
Home Services 226 1.13 76.91 
Medical Treatment 558 2.79 79.71 
Nightlife 60 0.30 80.01 
Pets Services 90 0.45 80.46 
Other Professional Services 734 3.67 84.13 
Restaurants 3,170 15.87 100.00 
Total 19,978 100.00  
 
Table 2. Summary Statistics 
 Variables N 
Nr. of 
deals Unit Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
Hourly sales 1,835,794 19,978  1.24 5.77 0 990 
Lag cumulative sales 1,835,794 19,978  76.33 149.32 0 990 
Total sales 19,978 19,978  113.81 194.39 0 990 
Transaction price 1,835,794 19,978 USD 52.44 154.68 2 6,440 
Original price 1,835,794 19,978 USD 142.74 364.00 5 12,582 
Discount percentage 1,835,794 19,978 0~100 55.55 14.34 1 99 
Maximum purchases allowed  1,835,794 19,978  5.49 21.16 1 540 
Number of Facebook fans  1,835,794 19,978  190,781 1,589,734 0 51,136,036 
Display review quotes (dummy) 1,835,794 19,978  0.02 0.12 0 1 
Number of options 1,835,794 19,978  2.00 1.40 1 42 
Number of competing deals 1,835,794 19,978  0.24 0.60 0 5 
Proxy for use restrictions 1,835,794 19,978  424.70 133.33 0 734 
Sold out finally (dummy) 1,835,794 19,978  0.03 0.16 0 1 
Merchant created deal (dummy) 1,835,794 19,978  0.03 0.16 0 1 
Days before expiration 1,835,794 19,978  212.78 120.91 30 358 
Online deal (dummy) 1,835,794 19,978  0.01 0.11 0 1 
Multi-region deal (dummy) 1,835,794 19,978  0.33 0.47 0 1 
Deal frequency 1,835,794 19,978  1.10 0.35 1 6 
Duration 1,835,794 19,978 Hour 102.64 55.76 12 926 
Review count 624,924 6,692  531.61 1623.73 1 8,778 
Average rating 624,924 6,692 1~5 3.70 0.66 1 5 
Credence goods deal (dummy) 1,835,794 19,978  0.04 0.18 0 1 
Median household income, 2008-2012 1,704,202 18,553 1,000 USD 54.77 10.60 24.65 90.75 
Bachelor's degree or higher,  
    % of persons age 25+, 2008-2012 1,704,202 18,553 0~100 33.90 9.75 8.50 58.10 
Average hourly wage (AHW) 1,704,202 18,553 USD 18.90 6.44 12.30 38.59 
House price index (HPI) 1,704,202 18,553  212.19 20.20 177.10 262.10 
 
Table 3. Correlations 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1. Hourly sales 1.00                  
2. Lag cumulative sales 0.31 1.00                 
3. Transaction price -0.15 -0.46 1.00                
4. Discount percentage -0.08 -0.16 0.06 1.00               
5. Maximum purchases 0.05 0.10 -0.06 -0.07 1.00              
6. Facebook fans 0.11 0.25 -0.14 -0.12 0.30 1.00             
7. Review quotes 0.02 0.05 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 -0.02 1.00            
8. Number of options -0.09 -0.23 0.04 0.15 -0.17 -0.27 -0.00 1.00           
9. Competing Deals -0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.02 1.00         
10. Use restriction proxy 0.01 0.04 0.04 -0.05 0.12 0.13 -0.01 0.03 0.04 1.00         
11. Sold out finally 0.12 0.19 -0.05 -0.05 0.13 0.25 -0.01 -0.16 0.05 0.07 1.00        
12. Merchant-created  deal 0.03 0.08 -0.01 -0.07 0.17 0.15 -0.01 -0.16 0.01 0.12 0.02 1.00       
13. Days before expiration 0.09 0.19 0.00 -0.19 0.36 0.35 0.01 -0.29 -0.02 0.12 0.15 0.18 1.00      
14. Online deal -0.02 -0.05 0.08 0.04 -0.01 -0.06 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 1.00     
15. Multi-region deal 0.04 0.08 -0.00 -0.05 0.37 0.42 -0.02 -0.21 -0.07 0.07 0.13 0.08 0.35 0.02 1.00    
16. Deal frequency -0.01 -0.03 0.04 -0.00 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.03 -0.01 0.11 0.04 -0.00 0.02 1.00   
17. Duration -0.05 0.11 -0.01 -0.03 0.09 0.11 0.01 -0.06 0.00 0.05 -0.07 0.10 0.09 -0.02 0.11 0.03 1.00  





















price -0.0103** -0.0274*** -0.0134** -0.0143*** -0.0290*** 
 (0.0040) (0.0077) (0.0056) (0.0030) (0.0082) 
discount -0.0195*** -0.0295*** -0.0192** -0.0187 -0.0266** 
 (0.0070) (0.0110) (0.0088) (0.0141) (0.0107) 
lag CS 0.1071*** 0.1227*** 0.1289*** 0.0443*** 0.1348*** 
 (0.0061) (0.0041) (0.0059) (0.0044) (0.0045) 
days before expiration 0.0330*** 0.0523*** 0.0241*** 0.0245*** 0.0738*** 
 (0.0057) (0.0065) (0.0071) (0.0060) (0.0061) 
merchant-created deal 0.0702*** 0.0833*** 0.0693*** 0.1671*** 0.2363** 
 (0.0208) (0.0235) (0.0200) (0.0350) (0.0838) 
facebook fans 0.0049*** 0.0039*** 0.0048*** 0.0046*** 0.0070*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0007) (0.0010) 
has review quotes 0.0448** 0.0306* 0.0205 0.0136 0.0951*** 
 (0.0175) (0.0171) (0.0195) (0.0129) (0.0301) 
sold out finally 0.2247*** 0.1294*** 0.1859*** 0.0931** 0.2771*** 
 (0.0280) (0.0226) (0.0351) (0.0330) (0.0609) 
duration -0.2382*** -0.3517*** -0.2955*** -0.0586*** -0.3294*** 
 (0.0280) (0.0277) (0.0315) (0.0145) (0.0289) 
options -0.0169*** -0.0213*** -0.0105 -0.0137* -0.0164 
 (0.0055) (0.0081) (0.0094) (0.0068) (0.0150) 
competing deals -0.0214*** -0.0274*** -0.0378*** -0.0085*** -0.0095 
 (0.0053) (0.0099) (0.0061) (0.0025) (0.0112) 
maximum purchases  0.0005 0.0162*** 0.0054 0.0096* 0.0108 
     allowed (0.0040) (0.0052) (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0087) 
use restriction proxy 0.0017 -0.0019 -0.0044 0.0015 0.0054 
 (0.0032) (0.0069) (0.0098) (0.0018) (0.0079) 
online deal -0.0404 -0.0542 -0.0594 0.0000 -- 
 (0.0579) (0.0621) (0.1052) (0.0175)  
multi-region deal 0.0105 0.0015 0.0215* 0.0198** -0.0107 
 (0.0086) (0.0144) (0.0118) (0.0076) (0.0149) 
deal frequency -0.0084 -0.0306** -0.0322** 0.0111 -0.0200 
 (0.0092) (0.0130) (0.0134) (0.0080) (0.0263) 
review count -- 0.0241*** -- -- -- 
  (0.0036)    
average rating -- 0.0054 -- -- -- 
  (0.0069)    
count × rating -- -0.0013 -- -- -- 
  (0.0033)    
division fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
subcategory fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,835,794 624,924 620,317 469,746 287,932 
R-squared 0.159 0.176 0.179 0.066 0.160 
Notes. The dependent variable is log hourly sales. Robust standard errors clustered by product subcategory in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 























price -0.0236*** -0.0745*** -0.0130*** -0.0132*** -0.0106*** 
 (0.0052) (0.0096) (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0040) 
discount -0.1021*** -0.4859*** -0.0610 -0.0650* -0.0185** 
 (0.0223) (0.0899) (0.0379) (0.0381) (0.0079) 
popular deals -- -- -- -- -0.0065 
     (0.0463) 
popular deals× discount -- -- -- -- -0.0018 
     (0.0112) 
lag CS 0.1286*** 0.1377*** 0.1078*** 0.1078*** 0.1070*** 
 (0.0022) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0061) 
days before expiration 0.0177*** 0.0547*** 0.0308*** 0.0307*** 0.0349*** 
 (0.0063) (0.0052) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0057) 
merchant-created  0.0703*** 0.2261*** 0.0668*** 0.0667*** 0.0720*** 
     deal (0.0135) (0.0853) (0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0204) 
facebook fans 0.0051*** 0.0065*** 0.0052*** 0.0052*** 0.0049*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0008) 
has review quotes 0.0211 0.1003*** 0.0523*** 0.0523*** 0.0447** 
 (0.0223) (0.0111) (0.0148) (0.0148) (0.0175) 
sold out finally 0.1907*** 0.2527*** 0.2361*** 0.2362*** 0.2241*** 
 (0.0157) (0.0222) (0.0156) (0.0156) (0.0287) 
duration -0.2960*** -0.3465*** -0.2405*** -0.2405*** -0.2386*** 
 (0.0157) (0.0072) (0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0282) 
options -0.0082 -0.0202*** -0.0160*** -0.0159*** -0.0173*** 
 (0.0071) (0.0053) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0055) 
competing deals -0.0380*** 0.0004 -0.0226*** -0.0226*** -0.0214*** 
 (0.0091) (0.0059) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0053) 
maximum purchases  0.0025 0.0088*** 0.0004 0.0004 0.0009 
     allowed (0.0038) (0.0034) (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0039) 
use restriction proxy -0.0075 -0.0015 0.0019 0.0019 0.0025 
 (0.0072) (0.0051) (0.0028) (0.0029) (0.0031) 
online deal -0.0152 -- -0.0216 -0.0207 -0.0403 
 (0.0708)  (0.0444) (0.0444) (0.0578) 
multi-region deal 0.0181*** -0.0643*** 0.0106** 0.0106** 0.0190 
 (0.0066) (0.0120) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0131) 
deal frequency -0.0306** -0.0047 -0.0103 -0.0104 -0.0084 
 (0.0119) (0.0120) (0.0071) (0.0071) (0.0092) 
division fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
subcategory fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 615,036 287,913 1,704,202 1,704,202 1,835,794 
R-squared 0.177 0.136 0.159 0.159 0.159 
Notes. The dependent variable is log hourly sales. Robust standard errors clustered by product subcategory in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 































price -0.0104** -0.0574*** 0.0158*** -0.0106*** -0.0155*** -0.0103** -0.0101** 
 (0.0040) (0.0165) (0.0045) (0.0040) (0.0032) (0.0042) (0.0043) 
discount -0.0077 -0.0382** -0.0791*** -0.0190*** -0.0220** -0.0155* -0.0136 
 (0.0066) (0.0168) (0.0140) (0.0071) (0.0092) (0.0083) (0.0086) 
days before expiration  -0.0231** -- -- -- -- -- -- 
     × discount (0.0108)       
progress -- -- -0.9618*** -- -- -- -- 
   (0.1128)     
progress × discount -- -- 0.1240*** -- -- -- -- 
   (0.0261)     
credence × discount -- -- -- -0.0696** -- -- -- 
    (0.0343)    
salesAbove300  -- -- -- -- 0.3651*** -- -- 
          (0.0266)   
salesAbove300 × discount -- -- -- -- 0.0479*** -- -- 
     (0.0112)   
income × discount -- -- -- -- -- -0.0593*** -- 
      (0.0193)  
education × discount -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.0410*** 
       (0.0126) 
lag CS 0.1071*** 0.1425*** 0.1484*** 0.1071*** 0.0793*** 0.1077*** 0.1077*** 
 (0.0062) (0.0072) (0.0094) (0.0061) (0.0046) (0.0063) (0.0063) 
days before  0.0339*** 0.0646*** 0.0224*** 0.0330*** 0.0289*** 0.0324*** 0.0323*** 
     expiration (0.0054) (0.0091) (0.0051) (0.0057) (0.0046) (0.0055) (0.0055) 
merchant-created  0.0702*** 0.1127 0.0582*** 0.0703*** 0.0590*** 0.0666*** 0.0665*** 
     deal (0.0208) (0.1469) (0.0187) (0.0208) (0.0196) (0.0209) (0.0209) 
facebook fans 0.0050*** 0.0053** 0.0031*** 0.0049*** 0.0045*** 0.0052*** 0.0052*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0023) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0009) 
has review quotes 0.0446** 0.0754** 0.0327** 0.0448** 0.0311** 0.0526*** 0.0523*** 
 (0.0175) (0.0318) (0.0149) (0.0175) (0.0157) (0.0184) (0.0184) 
sold out finally 0.2251*** 0.1479*** 0.1759*** 0.2246*** 0.1828*** 0.2343*** 0.2344*** 
 (0.0280) (0.0484) (0.0284) (0.0280) (0.0258) (0.0302) (0.0301) 
duration -0.2382*** -0.4154*** -0.2582*** -0.2383*** -0.2370*** -0.2402*** -0.2402*** 
 (0.0280) (0.0462) (0.0294) (0.0280) (0.0272) (0.0290) (0.0290) 
options -0.0172*** -0.0236 -0.0048 -0.0171*** -0.0183*** -0.0171*** -0.0172*** 
 (0.0055) (0.0198) (0.0053) (0.0055) (0.0048) (0.0055) (0.0055) 
competing deals -0.0215*** 0.0532 -0.0138** -0.0215*** -0.0208*** -0.0229*** -0.0229*** 
 (0.0053) (0.0420) (0.0054) (0.0053) (0.0049) (0.0055) (0.0055) 
maximum purchases  0.0001 0.0053 0.0007 0.0006 0.0011 0.0005 0.0003 
     allowed (0.0040) (0.0158) (0.0034) (0.0040) (0.0035) (0.0042) (0.0042) 
use restriction proxy 0.0017 -0.0040 -0.0012 0.0018 0.0029 0.0028 0.0029 
 (0.0032) (0.0268) (0.0033) (0.0032) (0.0027) (0.0033) (0.0033) 
online deal -0.0414 0.0178 -0.0184 -0.0400 -0.0445 -0.0321 -0.0318 
 (0.0577) (0.0861) (0.0586) (0.0580) (0.0466) (0.0666) (0.0664) 
multi-region deal 0.0099 0.0378** 0.0084 0.0107 0.0080 0.0113 0.0115 
 (0.0087) (0.0166) (0.0068) (0.0085) (0.0071) (0.0087) (0.0087) 
deal frequency -0.0083 0.0905 -0.0029 -0.0085 -0.0007 -0.0104 -0.0105 
 (0.0092) (0.0562) (0.0081) (0.0092) (0.0079) (0.0094) (0.0094) 
division fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
subcategory fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,835,794 97,200 1,835,794 1,835,794 1,835,794 1,704,202 1,704,202 
R-squared 0.159 0.210 0.184 0.159 0.169 0.160 0.160 
Notes. The dependent variable is log hourly sales. Robust standard errors clustered by product subcategory in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 





Table 7. Descriptive Statistics: Groupon Goods 
 Variables N No. of deals Unit Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
Hourly sales 17,692 382  3.16 19.41 0 930 
Lag cumulative sales 17,692 382  25.00 80.58 0 930 
Transaction price 17,692 382 USD 208.41 90.79 6 1449 
Original price 17,692 382 USD 425.58 320.46 12 6300 
Discount percentage 17,692 382 0~100 51.59 9.26 1 95 
Maximum purchases allowed 17,692 382  4.95 0.40 1 5 
Number of options 17,692 382  1.20 1.21 1 12 
Sold out finally (dummy) 17,692 382  0.01 0.01 0 1 
Duration 17,692 382 Hour 101.14 45.64 2 291 






























price -0.4625*** -0.6760*** -0.0976*** -0.0004*** -0.0221*** -0.0383*** -0.0063 
 (0.0268) (0.0127) (0.0085) (0.0001) (0.0028) (0.0065) (0.0039) 
discount 0.3714*** -0.1415*** -0.0270** -0.0045** -0.0213* -0.0291*** -0.0281** 
 (0.0898) (0.0275) (0.0134) (0.0021) (0.0108) (0.0098) (0.0114) 
lag CS 0.1796*** -- -0.0242*** 0.0084*** 0.1035*** 0.1019*** 0.0933*** 
 (0.0139)  (0.0056) (0.0005) (0.0031) (0.0072) (0.0055) 
lag CS squared -- -- -- -- 0.0322*** -- -- 
     (0.0014)   
days before expiration -- 0.2461*** 0.0753*** 0.0012*** 0.0261*** 0.0276*** 0.0278*** 
  (0.0179) (0.0096) (0.0002) (0.0039) (0.0051) (0.0047) 
merchant-created deal -- 0.1849** 0.1065*** 0.1129 0.0213 0.0895*** -0.0162 
  (0.0773) (0.0373) (0.1070) (0.0163) (0.0240) (0.0198) 
facebook fans -- 0.0475*** 0.0122*** 0.0003*** 0.0029*** 0.0049*** 0.0040*** 
  (0.0025) (0.0017) (0.0001) (0.0006) (0.0012) (0.0006) 
has review quotes -- 0.3708*** 0.0839*** 0.1880* 0.0291** 0.0607** 0.0395** 
  (0.0741) (0.0298) (0.1087) (0.0144) (0.0275) (0.0184) 
sold out finally -0.2254 1.3725*** 0.4500*** 2.0767*** 0.1390*** 0.2290*** 0.2554*** 
 (0.1769) (0.0460) (0.0276) (0.2163) (0.0223) (0.0385) (0.0584) 
duration -0.5742*** 0.6722*** -0.2010*** -0.0060*** -0.2433*** -0.2240*** 0.0206 
 (0.0257) (0.0325) (0.0343) (0.0013) (0.0261) (0.0417) (0.2092) 
options -0.4320*** -0.3206*** -0.0561*** -0.0090 -0.0031 -0.0166*** -0.0214*** 
 (0.0423) (0.0213) (0.0094) (0.0110) (0.0052) (0.0060) (0.0054) 
competing deals 0.3425*** -0.0524*** -0.0165*** -0.0777*** -0.0237*** -0.0297*** -0.0130*** 
 (0.0994) (0.0122) (0.0050) (0.0232) (0.0057) (0.0083) (0.0041) 
maximum purchases -0.0334 0.0237* 0.0007 0.0001 0.0008 0.0016 -0.0033 
     allowed (0.0860) (0.0129) (0.0061) (0.0001) (0.0033) (0.0041) (0.0043) 
use restriction proxy -- 0.0385** 0.0138*** -0.0003** -0.0015 0.0030 0.0002 
  (0.0150) (0.0049) (0.0001) (0.0032) (0.0028) (0.0032) 
online deal -- -0.2504 -0.1578* 0.0280 0.0109 -0.0706*** -0.0211 
  (0.2173) (0.0822) (0.2885) (0.0308) (0.0233) (0.0401) 
multi-region deal -- 0.0712*** 0.0188 0.1706*** 0.0098 0.0160* 0.0047 
  (0.0260) (0.0174) (0.0616) (0.0061) (0.0096) (0.0069) 
deal frequency -- -0.1192*** -0.0310* -0.0083 -0.0083 -0.0101 -0.0081 
  (0.0433) (0.0175) (0.0334) (0.0071) (0.0092) (0.0081) 
holiday percentage -- 0.0749* -- -- -- -- -- 
  (0.0426)      
division fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
subcategory fixed 
effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
time fixed effects Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 17,692 19,978 1,835,794 1,835,794 1,835,794 1,069,385 1,180,785 
R-squared 0.808 0.233 -- 0.111 0.173 0.157 0.132 
Notes. Except column 2, the dependent variable is log hourly sales and all independent variables except dummies are specified in logs. In 
column 3, we rescale facebook fans by dividing it by 10,000 for easier interpretation. Robust standard errors clustered by product subcategory 
in parentheses (except column 1). Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors used in column 1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 























 & Interaction 
Effects 
price -0.0110*** -0.0278*** -0.0500*** -0.0160*** -0.0164*** 
 (0.0039) (0.0077) (0.0114) (0.0057) (0.0057) 
discount -0.0146*** -0.0262** -0.0334*** -0.0145* -0.0124* 
 (0.0044) (0.0114) (0.0111) (0.0080) (0.0070) 
discount × facebook fans -0.0030*** -- -- -- -0.0023 
 (0.0011)    (0.0024) 
discount × has review -0.1114*** -- -- -- -0.2258*** 
     quotes (0.0190)    (0.0769) 
discount × review count -- -0.0059 -0.0177** -- -- 
  (0.0060) (0.0087)   
discount × average 
rating -- -0.0183 -0.0591*** -- -- 
  (0.0136) (0.0198)   
lag CS 0.1068*** 0.1227*** 0.1320*** 0.1149*** 0.1148*** 
 (0.0061) (0.0042) (0.0044) (0.0056) (0.0056) 
days before expiration 0.0333*** 0.0522*** 0.0646*** 0.0458*** 0.0460*** 
 (0.0057) (0.0065) (0.0098) (0.0057) (0.0057) 
merchant-created deal 0.0696*** 0.0819*** 0.0790*** 0.0816*** 0.0800*** 
 (0.0207) (0.0237) (0.0277) (0.0275) (0.0277) 
facebook fans 0.0048*** 0.0039*** 0.0060*** 0.0024** 0.0024** 
 (0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0019) (0.0010) (0.0009) 
has review quotes 0.0395** 0.0309* 0.0713*** 0.0109 0.0133 
 (0.0164) (0.0171) (0.0270) (0.0229) (0.0226) 
sold out finally 0.2238*** 0.1293*** 0.0834*** 0.2269*** 0.2271*** 
 (0.0283) (0.0227) (0.0186) (0.0295) (0.0291) 
duration -0.2385*** -0.3517*** -0.4272*** -0.2569*** -0.2573*** 
 (0.0280) (0.0279) (0.0179) (0.0202) (0.0202) 
options -0.0172*** -0.0215*** -0.0266** -0.0210** -0.0213** 
 (0.0055) (0.0080) (0.0112) (0.0087) (0.0087) 
competing deals -0.0216*** -0.0274*** -0.0474*** -0.0167** -0.0169** 
 (0.0053) (0.0100) (0.0132) (0.0073) (0.0074) 
maximum purchases 0.0011 0.0161*** 0.0186*** 0.0076* 0.0079* 
     allowed (0.0040) (0.0052) (0.0067) (0.0041) (0.0040) 
use restriction proxy 0.0013 -0.0020 -0.0118 0.0092* 0.0091* 
 (0.0032) (0.0069) (0.0132) (0.0051) (0.0051) 
online deal -0.0418 -0.0533 -0.1309 -0.0747** -0.0756** 
 (0.0586) (0.0618) (0.0995) (0.0364) (0.0368) 
multi-region deal 0.0087 0.0009 0.0027 0.0085 0.0074 
 (0.0081) (0.0142) (0.0223) (0.0087) (0.0084) 
deal frequency -0.0076 -0.0303** -0.0439* -0.0212** -0.0206** 
 (0.0091) (0.0130) (0.0256) (0.0100) (0.0101) 
review count -- 0.0238*** 0.0303*** -- -- 
  (0.0035) (0.0055)   
average rating -- 0.0060 0.0024 -- -- 
  (0.0070) (0.0144)   
count × rating -- -0.0020 -0.0172* -- -- 
  (0.0033) (0.0100)   
division fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
subcategory fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,835,794 624,924 329,089 770,619 770,619 
R-squared 0.159 0.176 0.191 0.156 0.156 
Notes. The dependent variable is log hourly sales. Robust standard errors clustered by subcategory in parentheses. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
  
Table 10. Threshold Effect of Discount 










    
discount (<60%) -0.0011 0.0027* 0.0276*** 
 (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0020) 
discount (≥60%) 0.0189*** -0.0145*** -0.0006 
 (0.0031) (0.0026) (0.0033) 
deal fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
subject fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
order fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,123 4,123 4,123 
R-squared 0.265 0.264 0.310 
Notes. All variables are specified in their original values (without taking logs). 
Robust standard errors clustered by subject in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 




WHEN DISCOUNTS HURT SALES: THE CASE OF DAILY-DEAL MARKETS 
ONLINE APPENDIX 
The materials presented here follow the order of appearance in the main text. 




Table A.1. List of the subcategories 
Automotive Services: Auto Glass Services, Auto Parts & Accessories, Auto Repair*, Car 
Dealers, Car Wash & Detailing, Motorcycle Dealers, Oil Change, 
Parking, Stereo Installation, Tires & Wheels (Total: 10) 
Beauty and Spas: Beauty Products, Body Wrap, Body-Contouring, Body Massage, 
Eyelash Services, Facial Care, Foot Massage, Hair Salon, Laser Hair 
Removal*, Makeup Artists, Men's Salon, Nail Salon, Oxygen Bar, Reiki, 
Salt Therapy, Sauna, Skin-Tag Removal, Tanning Salon, Tattoo 
Removal, Teeth Whitening, Vein Treatment, Waxing (Total: 22) 
Education: Acting Classes, Art Classes, Bartending Schools, Camera Techniques, 
Computer Training, Cooking Classes, Cosmetology Schools, Dance 
Lessons, Driving Lessons, Educational Services, Flight Instruction, 
Language Schools, Makeup Class, Music Lessons, Paddleboard Lesson, 
Preschools, Private Tutors, Specialty Schools, Speed Reading, 
Swimming Lessons, Training & Vocational Schools, Wine Classes (Total: 
22) 
Entertainment: Alcohol Event, Amusement Park, Aquariums, Archery, 
Arts/Crafts/Hobbies, Balloon Ride, Biking, Boat Tour, Boating, 
Botanical Garden, Bowling, Brewery Tour, Casino, Circus, Comedy, 
Country Clubs, Creamery Tour, Dance, Dinner Theater, Diving, Farm 
Tours, Film Festival, Fishing, Flight, Food Tour, Gaming, Ghost Tour, 
Go-Kart, Golf, Historical Tour, Home/Garden Show, Horse/Carriage 
Ride, Individual Speakers, Karaoke, Kid's Activities, Laser Tag, Magic 
Show, Miniature Golf, Miscellaneous Events, Miscellaneous Exhibition, 
Movie Tickets, Museum, Music Concert, Mystery Date, Other Outdoor 
Adventure, Other Specialty Tour, Paintball, Palace of Wax, Pool Party, 
Running Event, Segway Tour, Shooting, Sightseeing Tour, Skating, 
Skiing, Skydiving, Speedway, Sporting Activity, Sporting Event, Spring 
Jumping, Supercar Driving, Surfing, Symphony & Orchestra, Talent 
Show, Theater & Plays, Train Tour, Water Park, Winery Tour, 
Workshops and Seminars, Zipline Tour, Zoos (Total: 71) 
Food & Drinks: Alcohol Store, Bagel Shops, Breweries, Butchers & Meat Shops, Candy 
Stores, Cheese Shops, Chocolate Shops, Coffee & Tea Shops, 
Cupcakes/Dessert/Bakery, Food Delivery Services, Grocery Stores, 
Health Stores*, Ice Cream & Frozen Yogurt, Juice Bars & Smoothies, 
Organic Food*, Seafood Markets (Total: 16) 
Health & Fitness: Badminton, Baseball, Bootcamp, Crossfit, Fitness Classes, Gyms & 
Fitness Centers, Karate, Kickboxing, Martial Arts, Personal Training, 
Pilates, Rock Climbing, Taekwondo, Tennis, Yoga (Total: 15) 
Home Services: Carpet Cleaning, Chimney Sweep, Gardeners, Gutter Cleaning, 
Handyman Services*, Heating & Ventilation & Air Conditioning*, Home 
Cleaning, Home Repair*, Interior Designers & Decorators*, Junk 
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Removal, Lawn Care Services,  Movers, Painters, Pest & Animal 
Control, Pool Cleaners, Tree Services, Window Washing (Total: 17) 
Medical Treatments: Acupuncture*, Arthritis*, Chiropractic*, Craniosacral Therapy*, 
Dentists*, Dermatology*, Detoxification*, Food Allergy*, Hearing aid*, 
Hormone Therapy*, Hydrotherapy*, Hypnotherapy*, Laser Eye 
Surgery/Lasik*, Medical Exam & Consultation*, Nail-Fungus 
Treatment*, Optometrists*, Orthodontics*, Reflexology*,  Stress 
Management* (Total: 19) 
Nightlife and Bars: Cigar Bars, Dance Clubs, Gay Bars, Irish Pubs, Jazz & Blues Clubs, 
Lounges, Music Venues, Night Clubs, Piano Bars, Pool Halls, 
Pubs/Sports Bars, Social Clubs, Wine Bars (Total: 13) 
Pets Services: Horse Services & Equipment, Pet Boarding/Pet Sitting*, Pet Groomers, 
Pet Washing, Veterinarians* (Total: 5) 
Restaurants: African, American, Asian, Breakfast & Brunch, Cafe & Tearoom, 
Caribbean, Deli & Fast Food, European, French, Fusion Dishes, 
Hawaiian, Indian, Italian 
Latin, Mediterranean, Middle Eastern, Pub Food, Seafood, Spanish, 
Specialty Meal, Vegan & Health Food (Total: 21) 
Other Professional 
Services: 
Accountants, Car Rental, Catering & Bartending Services, Digital 
Conversion, Dry Cleaning & Laundry, Electronics Repair*, Event 
Planner, Magazine Subscription, Photography, Printing & Copying 
Equipment & Services, Resume Services, Self-Storage, Shoe Repair*, 
Watch Repair* (Total: 14) 
Notes. Subcategories classified as credence goods are in italics and labeled with asterisk. 
 
 
Table A.2. List of the local geographic markets 
American 
Cities: 
Abilene, Akron-Canton, Albany Capital Region, Albany(GA), Albuquerque, 
Allentown-Reading, Amarillo, Anchorage, Ann Arbor, Appleton, Asheville, 
Athens(GA), Atlanta, Augusta, Austin, Bakersfield, Baltimore, Baton Rouge, 
Billings, Birmingham, Boise, Boston, Buffalo, Cedar Rapids-Iowa City, Central 
Jersey, Charleston, Charlotte, Chattanooga, Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland, 
Colorado Springs, Columbia, Columbia(MO), Columbus, Columbus(GA), Corpus 
Christi, Dallas, Dayton, Daytona Beach, Denver, Des Moines, Detroit, El Paso, Erie, 
Eugene, Evansville, Fairfield County, Fort Lauderdale, Fort Myers-Cape Coral, Fort 
Wayne, Fort Worth, Fresno, Gainesville, Grand Rapids, Green Bay, Greenville, 
Hampton Roads, Harrisburg, Hartford, Honolulu, Houston, Huntsville, 
Indianapolis, Inland Empire, Jackson, Jacksonville, Kalamazoo, Kansas City, 
Knoxville, Lakeland, Lansing, Las Vegas, Lexington, Lincoln, Little Rock, Long Island, 
Los Angeles, Louisville, Lubbock, Macon, Madison, Memphis, Miami, Midland-
Odessa, Milwaukee, Minneapolis-St. Paul, Mobile Baldwin County, Modesto, 
Montgomery, Napa-Sonoma, Naples, Nashville, New Orleans, New York, North 
Jersey, Ocala, Ogden, Oklahoma City, Omaha, Orange County, Orlando, Palm 
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Beach, Pensacola, Philadelphia, Phoenix, Piedmont Triad, Pittsburgh, Portland, 
Portland(ME), Providence, Raleigh-Durham, Reno, Richmond, Rio Grande Valley, 
Roanoke, Rochester, Rockford, Sacramento, Salem(OR), Salt Lake City, San Angelo, 
San Antonio, San Diego, San Francisco, San Jose, Santa Barbara, Santa Cruz, 
Savannah-Hilton Head, Seattle, Shreveport-Bossier, Sioux Falls, South Bend, 
Spokane Coeur D’Alene, Springfield(MA), Springfield(MO), St. Louis, Stockton, 
Syracuse, Tallahassee, Tampa Bay Area, Toledo, Topeka-Lawrence, Tucson, Tulsa, 
Ventura County, Washington DC, Westchester County, Wichita, Wilmington-
Newark, Worcester, Youngstown (Total: 152) 
Canadian 
Cities: 
Abbotsford, Barrie, Calgary, Edmonton, Greater Toronto Area, Halifax, Kelowna, 
Kingston, Kitchener-Waterloo, London, Ottawa, Regina, Saskatoon, St. John’s, St. 
Catharines-Niagara, Sudbury, Vancouver, Victoria, Windsor, Winnipeg (Total: 20) 
 
 
SURVEY ON CONSUMER FAMILIARITY ON GROUPON MERCHANTS (SECTION 3) 
We compare consumers’ familiarity with the local merchants featured in daily deal websites with 
their familiarity with some large or national brands that often appear in online retailing websites. 
Within the Automotive and Food & Drink categories, we randomly chose five Groupon deals 
offered by local merchants in a big U.S. city in our sample. Then, we randomly selected five brands 
offering similar products on Amazon.com. We provided the screenshots of these 10 merchants 
in the survey and asked respondents to rate, on a 7-point Likert scale, their familiarity with each 
merchant (1 = less familiar, 7 = more familiar). The following table lists the merchants used in the 
survey. The survey is available at: https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/KF3R9SR. 
Groupon merchants Amazon merchants 
DFW Camper Corral Mobil 1 
Precision Auto Care Stoner 
MasterTech Auto Kensun 
Rodriguez Bakery & Restaurant Hostess 
Sweet Genius Treats Oreo 
 
We conducted the survey on SurveyMonkey (https://www.surveymonkey.com/). We 
acquired 50 responses from residents in the city where the five local merchants used in the 
survey are located. The mean familiarity score for the five Groupon merchants is 2.0, whereas 
the mean familiarity score for the five Amazon merchants is 4.5. The difference is statistically 
significant (t = 13.6, p < 0.01). This result implies that relative to the brands in Amazon.com, 
people are less aware or familiar with the local merchants featured in Groupon. 
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IV ESTIMATOR INSTRUMENTING FOR BOTH PRICE AND DISCOUNT (SECTION 4.2) 
Table A.3 reports the IV estimator instrumenting for both transaction price and discount. The 
results in the Entertainment and Restaurant categories are largely consistent with those reported 
in Table 5, columns (1) and (2). Importantly, the coefficients of discounts in Table A.3, columns 
(1) and (2), remain negative and statistically significant.   
 
The results with AHW and HPI as instruments is similar to those reported in Table 5, 
column (3), with the exception that both price and discount have a negative sign that is not 
statistically significant. This is not too surprising because, as discussed in Section 4.2, HPI is not a 
good instrument. In fact, neither AHW nor HPI is a good instrument for transaction price.  














price 0.0577 -0.1013* -0.4958 
 (0.0867) (0.0542) (0.3863) 
discount -0.0872*** -0.5086*** -0.0445 
 (0.0266) (0.1008) (0.0703) 
lag CS 0.1378*** 0.1361*** 0.0420 
 (0.0102) (0.0034) (0.0526) 
days before expiration 0.0137* 0.0563*** 0.0882* 
 (0.0074) (0.0061) (0.0462) 
merchant-created deal 0.0627*** 0.2229*** 0.1253** 
 (0.0152) (0.0856) (0.0532) 
facebook fans 0.0046*** 0.0066*** 0.0087*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0029) 
has review quotes 0.0119 0.1060*** 0.1111** 
 (0.0241) (0.0161) (0.0531) 
sold out finally 0.1780*** 0.2554*** 0.3186*** 
 (0.0211) (0.0229) (0.0688) 
duration -0.3123*** -0.3478*** -0.1822*** 
 (0.0237) (0.0076) (0.0501) 
options 0.0083 -0.0193*** -0.1064 
 (0.0191) (0.0056) (0.0728) 
competing Deals -0.0360*** 0.0004 -0.0325*** 
 (0.0093) (0.0059) (0.0109) 
maximum purchases allowed 0.0104 0.0088*** -0.0328 
 (0.0092) (0.0034) (0.0268) 
use restriction proxy -0.0148 0.0008 0.0411 
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 (0.0112) (0.0068) (0.0317) 
online deal -0.0839 -- 0.2454 
 (0.1011)  (0.2280) 
multi-regional deal 0.0064 -0.0677*** 0.0125 
 (0.0141) (0.0139) (0.0086) 
deal frequency -0.0410** -0.0058 0.0053 
 (0.0163) (0.0122) (0.0184) 
division fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
subcategory fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 615,036 287,913 1,704,202 
R-squared 0.174 0.133 0.024 
Notes. The dependent variable is log hourly sales. Robust standard errors clustered by product 
subcategory in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
FIRST-STAGE REGRESSION RESULTS FOR THE IV ESTIMATORS (SECTION 4.2) 
Table A.4 reports the first-stage regression results for the IV estimators reported in Table 5. 














price -0.1136*** -0.0972***  -0.0725*** 
 (0.0116) (0.0029)  (0.0058) 
lag CS -0.0029 0.0062***  0.0047* 
 (0.0045) (0.0008)  (0.0026) 
days before expiration -0.0581*** -0.0445***  -0.0408*** 
 (0.0123) (0.0013)  (0.0054) 
merchant-created deal 0.0045 -0.0145**  -0.0095 
 (0.0303) (0.0066)  (0.0300) 
facebook fans 0.0030 -0.0013***  0.0026** 
 (0.0019) (0.0002)  (0.0012) 
has review quotes 0.0125 0.0049  0.0005 
 (0.0436) (0.0039)  (0.0224) 
sold out finally 0.0536*** -0.0522***  0.0476** 
 (0.0208) (0.0029)  (0.0189) 
duration 0.0094 -0.0421***  -0.0054 
 (0.0261) (0.0025)  (0.0147) 
options 0.0415** -0.0085***  0.0295*** 
 (0.0172) (0.0026)  (0.0077) 
maximum purchases allowed -0.0385*** -0.0024  -0.0054 
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 (0.0129) (0.0020)  (0.0063) 
use restriction proxy -0.0257** -0.0113***  -0.0180*** 
 (0.0111) (0.0014)  (0.0038) 
online deal 0.5151*** --  0.2548*** 
 (0.0996)   (0.0566) 
multi-regional deal -0.0206 -0.1172***  -0.0143 
 (0.0161) (0.0039)  (0.0102) 
deal frequency -0.0224 0.0307***  -0.0042 
 (0.0344) (0.0049)  (0.0155) 
competing deals -0.0016 0.0214***  -0.0009 
 (0.0222) (0.0019)  (0.0085) 
days before expiration (others) -0.0002 -0.0014*** AHW -0.3940*** 
 (0.0012) (0.0002)  (0.0502) 
merchant-created deal (others) 0.0087*** -0.0032 HPI 0.0019 
 (0.0022) (0.0027)  (0.0026) 
facebook fans (others) 0.0005 -0.0001***  -- 
 (0.0011) (0.0000)   
has review quotes (others) 0.0066*** -0.0083***  -- 
 (0.0011) (0.0005)   
sold out finally (others) -0.0001 0.0031***  -- 
 (0.0001) (0.0012)   
duration (others) 0.0167*** 0.0001***  -- 
 (0.0051) (0.0000)   
options (others) 0.0130*** -0.0020***  -- 
 (0.0015) (0.0003)   
maximum purchases allowed  0.0022** 0.0041***  -- 
(others) (0.0009) (0.0002)   
use restriction proxy (others) -0.0249 0.0005***  -- 
 (0.0188) (0.0002)   
online deal (others) -0.0020 --  -- 
 (0.0013)    
multi-regional deal (others) -0.0065*** 0.0022***  -- 
 (0.0013) (0.0003)   
deal frequency (others) -0.0078** 0.0014***  -- 
 (0.0039) (0.0002)   
division fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes 
subcategory fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes 
time fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes 
Observations 615,036 287,913  1,704,202 
R-squared 0.412 0.141  0.401 
Notes. The dependent variable is log discount. Robust standard errors clustered by product subcategory in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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CLUSTER ANALYSIS (SECTION 4.3) 
We conduct a cluster analysis to separate the 19,978 deals based on their characteristics. We use 
the following deal characteristics in the clustering: transaction price, discount percentage, days 
before expiration, merchant-created deal, Facebook fans, has review quotes, sold out finally, 
duration, number of options, number of competing deals, holiday percentage, maximum 
purchases allowed, use restriction proxy, online deal, multi-regional deal, deal frequency, city, 
subcategory. We exclude the online review data as they are not available on all deals. In 
performing the clustering, we use the original (unlogged) version of these variables.  
 Note that because the deal characteristics do not vary over time, we use the cross-
sectional deal data to perform the clustering. We compute the number of competing deals as the 
total number of deals that have ever overlapped with the focal deals during their entire lifespan. 
Furthermore, to account for “seasonality” of the online daily deals, we construct another variable, 
holiday percentage, that represents the percentage of weekends and public holidays in each 
deal’s duration.   
 Because the deal characteristics comprise both qualitative and quantitative variables, we 
use Gower’s distance (Gower 1971) to calculate the (dis)similarity matrix for the deals. Gower’s 
distance uses a different distance metric for each variable type. For quantitative variables, it uses 
range-normalized Manhattan distance. For nominal variables with k categories, it first converts 
the data into k binary columns and then computes the Dice similarity coefficient (Dice 1945). Also, 
because of the mixed variable type, we use the K-medoid clustering algorithm, which is similar 
to the widely-used K-means algorithm. We use the common partitioning around medoids (PAM) 
method. The detailed steps are as follows. 
1. Choose K random observations (deals) as medoids (centers or exemplars). 
2. Assign all remaining observations to their closest medoids according to distance. 
3. For each cluster, identify the observation that yields the lowest average distance if it were 
to be assigned as the medoid. Make this observation the new medoid. 
4. Return to Step 2 and repeat the steps if at least one medoid has changed.  
To determine the number of clusters, we use the average silhouette value (Rousseeuw 1987). It 
measures the similarity of an object to its own cluster when compared with other clusters. The 
silhouette value ranges from -1 to 1. A higher silhouette value indicates that the object is well 
matched to its own cluster and poorly matched to neighboring clusters. Hence, the average 
silhouette value measures how well the data have been clustered. Having too many or too few 
clusters will both cause the average silhouette value to drop. Referring to Figure A.2, the highest 




Figure A.2. Average silhouette value  
 
With K = 2, one cluster has 13,203 deals and the other cluster has 6,775 deals. Table A.5 compares 
the two clusters in terms of deal characteristics. Table A.6 presents the distribution of deals in 
the 12 categories in the two cluster. In general, the deals in Cluster 2 have more Facebook fans 
than the deals in Cluster 1 (t = 14.79, p < 0.01). They are more likely sold out too (t = 19.77, p < 
0.01). Furthermore, the deals in Cluster 2 are more likely offered by merchants that operate in 
multiple cities (t = 170.00, p < 0.01) and have more online reviews (t = 24.10, p < 0.01). In view of 
these post hoc comparisons, we believe that the cluster analysis has successfully separated the 










Table A.5. Comparison of Deal Characteristics   
 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 
p-value 
of t-
tests Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
transaction price 13,203 53.11 154.82 2 6,440 6,775 50.07 150.47 2 2981 0.181 
discount percentage 13,203 56.12 12.43 1 98 6,775 54.95 17.63 1 99 0.000 
days before expiration 13,203 163.25 101.81 30 358 6,775 302.00 98.96 30 358 0.000 
merchant-created deal 13,203 0.00 0.05 0 1 6,775 0.06 0.24 0 1 0.000 
Facebook fans 13,203 4,708.98 251,258.50 0 2.67E+07 6,775 573,527.10 3,161,434.00 0 5.11E+07 0.000 
has review quotes 13,203 0.02 0.13 0 1 6,775 0.01 0.11 0 1 0.002 
sold out finally 13,203 0.01 0.10 0 1 6,775 0.08 0.27 0 1 0.000 
duration 13,203 90.79 28.31 12 926 6,775 95.74 32.18 24 765 0.000 
nr. of options 13,203 2.14 1.06 1 32 6,775 1.74 1.84 1 42 0.000 
nr. of competing deals 13,203 4.32 5.29 1 41 6,775 3.34 4.50 1 38 0.000 
holiday percentage 13,203 0.32 0.21 0 1 6,775 0.34 0.22 0 1 0.000 
max. purchases 
allowed 13,203 4.11 23.51 1 540 6,775 7.86 14.74 1 540 0.000 
use restriction proxy 13,203 383.47 106.16 0 734 6,775 495.90 144.87 0 734 0.000 
online deal 13,203 0.01 0.11 0 1 6,775 0.01 0.12 0 1 0.327 
multi-regional deal 13,203 0.05 0.21 0 1 6,775 0.85 0.35 0 1 0.000 
deal frequency 13,203 1.09 0.33 1 4 6,775 1.11 0.41 1 6 0.000 
review count 4,422 57.38 114.57 1 2,951 2,270 1,229.23 2,315.37 1 8,778 0.000 
average rating 4,422 3.64 0.72 1 5 2,270 3.83 0.55 1 5 0.000 
 
Table A.6. Deal Distributions 
  Cluster 1 Cluster 2 
Category Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
Automotive 172 1.3 99 1.46 
Beauty & Spas 4,801 36.36 429 6.33 
Education 175 1.33 516 7.62 
Entertainment 2,502 18.95 4,022 59.37 
Food & Drink 381 2.89 241 3.56 
Health & Fitness 1,467 11.11 337 4.97 
Home Services 143 1.08 83 1.23 
Medical 461 3.49 94 1.39 
Nightlife 54 0.41 6 0.09 
Pets 29 0.22 61 0.9 
Professional Services 115 0.87 619 9.14 
Restaurants 2,903 21.99 268 3.96 




QUANTILE REGRESSION AND ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINUOUS ENDOGENOUS TREAMTNET 
EFFECT (SECTION 4.3) 
We conduct a quantile regression to estimate the impacts of discount at the lower quartile, 
median, and upper quartile of sales. Because the concern lies in merchants self-selecting into 
offering different levels of discount, we focus exclusively on between-merchant differences. In 
particular, we regress the final sales of the deals on the discounts offered using a cross-section 
of the 19,978 deals without the time-varying covariates such as lagged cumulative sales. Because 
of the change in specification, some of the independent variables in the panel model do not apply. 
Please refer to footnote 16 in the main text for the details. 
We perform simultaneous-quantile regression, which allows us to test the equality of the 
coefficients at the different quartiles. Table A.7, columns (1)-(3) report the lower quartile, median, 
and upper quartile regressions. The discount effect is negative and statistically significant among 
merchants in the median and upper quartile of sales (p < 0.01), but it is statistically insignificant 
among the lower-quartile merchants. This negative discount effect is not statistically different 
among the median and upper-quartile merchants (F = 0.17, p = 0.68). Because the discount effect 
is weakest in the lower quartile and not different between the median and upper quartile, the 
quantile regression result does not support the competing explanation that merchants self-select 
to offer discounts by their expected sales levels. 
To ensure that our result is robust in the panel data, we repeat the quantile regression 
using the whole panel, i.e., the specification in equation (1). The results are reported in Table A.7, 
columns (4)-(6). Once again, the result does not support the merchant self-selection explanation. 
Despite the consistent evidence, we caution that this regression does not strictly separate the 
merchants into the different quartiles because there are many observations for each merchant 
(due to the inclusion of multiple time periods). 
Furthermore, we follow the approach proposed by Garen (1984) to examine the potential 
selectivity bias in our treatment variable, i.e., discount. We follow the procedures in Wooldridge 
(2015), viz. using bootstrapping to obtain valid standard errors. We set the number of repetitions 
to 1,000. In principle, this analysis is akin to an extended two-stage least squares regression. In 
the first-stage, we use average hourly wage (AHW) and housing price index (HPI) as the excluded 
instruments. In addition to the endogenous variable, i.e., discount, the residuals from the first 
stage regression and its interaction with discount are added to the second-stage regression. In 
this framework, a positive coefficient of the interaction effect in the second stage is consistent 
with the presence of selectivity bias (Wooldridge 2015).  
As reported in Table A.7, column (7), the coefficient of the focal interaction, discount x 
discount_resid, is statistically insignificant, which does not support the presence of selectivity 
bias according to discount. The coefficient of discount continues to be negative and statistically 
significant. Interestingly, the coefficient of the residuals from the first-stage regression is positive 
and statistically significant. This implies that deals offering unexpectedly large discounts (after 
accounting for potentially endogenous discount strategy) did tend to enjoy better sales, possibly 
because they help consumers save costs. 
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price -0.6960*** -0.6883*** -0.6953*** -0.0017*** -0.0013** -0.0043*** -0.0915*** 
 (0.0128) (0.0131) (0.0182) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0013) 
discount -0.0505 -0.2451*** -0.2350*** -0.0043*** -0.0000 -0.0091*** -1.1415*** 
 (0.0485) (0.0318) (0.0166) (0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0016) (0.0144) 
discount_resid -- -- -- -- -- -- 1.1401*** 
       (0.0143) 
discount_resid -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.0008 
     x discount       (0.0009) 
lag CS -- -- -- 0.0138*** 0.0187*** 0.0359*** 0.1120*** 
    (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0005) 
days before expiration 0.2036*** 0.2374*** 0.3050*** 0.0078*** 0.0082*** 0.0147*** -0.0124*** 
 (0.0271) (0.0251) (0.0288) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0013) 
merchant-created deal 0.1398* 0.1560** 0.3447*** 0.0129*** 0.0190*** 0.0358*** 0.0582*** 
 (0.0821) (0.0756) (0.0896) (0.0019) (0.0015) (0.0035) (0.0047) 
facebook fans 0.0475*** 0.0504*** 0.0445*** 0.0013*** 0.0015*** 0.0024*** 0.0078*** 
 (0.0043) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
has review quotes 0.3412*** 0.4782*** 0.4218*** 0.0111*** 0.0135*** 0.0283*** 0.0534*** 
 (0.0852) (0.1073) (0.0635) (0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0039) (0.0056) 
sold out finally 1.7125*** 1.3789*** 1.1193*** 0.0500*** 0.1069*** 1.0085*** 0.2843*** 
 (0.0759) (0.0745) (0.0501) (0.0016) (0.0041) (0.0112) (0.0058) 
duration 0.8152*** 0.7148*** 0.5857*** -0.0500*** -0.0630*** -0.1009*** -0.2499*** 
 (0.0446) (0.0353) (0.0376) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0017) (0.0025) 
options -0.3728*** -0.3976*** -0.2799*** -0.0030*** -0.0021*** -0.0078*** 0.0148*** 
 (0.0265) (0.0284) (0.0218) (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0014) 
competing deals -0.0477*** -0.0563*** -0.0687*** -0.0022** -0.0040*** -0.0107*** -0.0175*** 
 (0.0158) (0.0155) (0.0159) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0019) 
maximum purchases  0.0546** 0.0159 0.0064 -0.0014*** -0.0011*** -0.0003 -0.0054*** 
     allowed (0.0213) (0.0152) (0.0162) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0008) 
use restriction proxy 0.0484 0.0365** 0.0306* 0.0016** -0.0005 -0.0011*** -0.0187*** 
 (0.0335) (0.0159) (0.0157) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0010) 
online deal -0.2434 -0.3490 -0.3235 -0.0221*** -0.0492*** -0.0385*** 0.2630*** 
 (0.2842) (0.3771) (0.1980) (0.0076) (0.0119) (0.0073) (0.0132) 
multi-region deal 0.0438 0.0806** 0.1226*** 0.0059*** 0.0011 -0.0021*** -0.0048*** 
 (0.0273) (0.0329) (0.0415) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0016) 
deal frequency -0.1041** -0.1225** -0.1078 -0.0064*** -0.0034*** -0.0009 -0.0167*** 
 (0.0417) (0.0507) (0.0674) (0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0018) (0.0023) 
Holiday percentage 0.0939 0.0625 0.0684 -- -- -- -- 
 (0.0643) (0.0488) (0.0515)     
division fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
subcategory fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
time fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 19,978 19,978 19,978 1,835,794 1,835,794 1,835,794 1,704,202 
R-squared n.a. n.a. n.a. -- -- -- 0.066 
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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CLASSIFICATION OF CREDENCE GOODS (SECTION 4.4) 
Table A.1 in this Appendix presents the list of credence and experience goods. We verified our 
classification of credence goods in two ways. First, we recruited five PhD students and provided 
them with the following definition of credence goods:  
A credence good is defined as a good whose utility is difficult or impossible for consumers to 
ascertain even after consumption. Common examples of credence goods include expert services 
such as medical or legal consultations, as well as repair services provided by auto mechanics and 
appliance service persons. In these services, the service providers often serve as “experts” who 
determine how much treatment or repair the clients need, and they have incentives to “overtreat” 
the clients. For example, brake shoes changed prematurely work just as if the shoes replaced had 
really been faulty; so does the patient with his appendix removed unnecessarily (Emons 1997, page 
107). Organic food is also an example of credence good because consumers cannot ascertain 
whether the food is really produced organically (Dulleck et al. 2011, page 527). 
Credence good is often contrasted against experience good whose utility can be ascertained after 
consumption (Nelson 1970). For example, people can immediately know the quality or value of a 
dish/movie after consuming or experiencing it.  
References: 
Dulleck, Uwe, Rudolf Kerschbamer, and Matthias Sutter. 2011. The Economics of Credence Goods: 
An Experiment on the Role of Liability, Verifiability, Reputation, and Competition. The American 
Economic Review, 101(2), pp. 526-555. 
 
Emons, Winand. 1997. Credence Goods and Fraudulent Experts. The RAND Journal of Economics, 
28(1), pp. 107-119. 
 
Nelson, Philip. 1970. Information and Consumer Behavior. Journal of Political Economy, 78(2), pp. 
311-329. 
We then asked each of the five PhD students to rate, on a scale of 1 to 7 (1 = least likely 
and 7 = most likely), the extent to which each of the 245 deal subcategories (see Table A.1) is a 
credence good. The following example shows the format of the questions: 
Category Sub-category 
Scale  
(Please Circle Your Answer) 
  Least                                                  Most 
  Likely                                             Likely 
Automotive Services: Auto Glass Services                                    1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
 Auto Parts & Accessories      1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
 Auto Repair                        1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
 Car & Motorcycle Dealers            1        2        3        4        5        6        7 
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The average score of the subcategories that we classify as credence goods is 4.3, whereas 
the average score of those that we do not classify as credence goods is 2.4. This difference in 
score, 1.9, is large in view of the fact that the overall average for all 245 subcategories is only 2.6 
and the variance is 1.1.  
Second, we conducted a similar survey on SurveyMonkey. Because of length concern, 
SurveyMonkey does not allow us to launch a survey with 245 questions for all subcategories. 
Hence, we re-organized the 245 subcategories into 37 groups. Each group contains subcategories 
that involve similar degrees of quality uncertainty. Furthermore, to avoid confusing subjects with 
terms such as experience or credence goods, we used a more intuitive introduction in this survey 
and asked subjects to rate, on a scale of 1 to 7 (1 = extremely easy and 7 = extremely difficult), 
the difficulty in assessing the products’ quality after consumption. The survey is available at: 
https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/KHRDZXP. 
 We collected 50 responses from a random sample of U.S. residents. Among them, seven 
are invalid because the subjects chose the same answer for all or the majority (> 90%) of the 
questions. Hence, we discarded these seven responses. The average score of the subcategories 
that we classify as credence goods is 3.5, whereas the average score of those that we do not 
classify as credence goods is 2.9. The difference is statistically significant (t = 6.2, p < 0.01). Once 
again, the survey result suggests that our classification of credence goods is valid.  
 We repeated the test in Table 6, column (4) by replacing the credence indicator with the 
average scores obtained from the 43 survey responses. The following table presents the key 
coefficients of interest: 





avgScore × discount -0.0223 
 (0.0199) 





 The main effect of avgScore is collinear with the subcategory fixed effects and hence 
cannot be separately estimated. Consistent with our empirical strategy, the coefficient of the 
interaction effect, avgScore × discount, is negative, albeit it is not statistically significant (p = 0.26). 
This could be due to the coarse grouping of subcategories in the survey. 
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ADDITIONAL IDENTIFICATION AND ROBUSTNESS TESTS (SECTIONS 4.5 & 4.6) 
Columns (1) and (2) of Table A.8 present the estimation results when the threshold is set to 200 
and 400. The results are consistent with those reported in Table 6, column (5), which uses 300 as 
the threshold. Column (3) reports a robustness test which excludes extreme transaction prices. 
Column (4) includes linear and quadratic time trends. Column (5) includes day-specific city fixed 
effects and column (6) includes day-specific subcategory fixed effects. Column (7) clusters the 
standard errors by deal instead of product subcategory. All of these tests produce the same 
conclusion, that discount has a negative impact on online daily deal sales. 
 
Moreover, we apply the GMM framework to test for the presence of auto-correlation in 
our data (Arellano and Bond 1991; Zhang and Liu 2012). We estimate a first-difference model 
with hourly sales as the dependent variable and include one lag of the DV as a regressor. The first 
difference removes all time-invariant attributes, which is also the reason why we cannot use the 
GMM model to identify the discount effect. We then test the null hypothesis of no serially-
correlated errors by checking whether there are second-order serial correlations in the residuals 
of the first-difference equation. Note that first-order serial correlations in the first-difference 
equation is expected by design (Arellano and Bond 1991; Zhang and Liu 2012). From this dynamic 
GMM estimation, we do not find statistically significant second-order serial correlations of the 
residuals (z = -0.297, p = 0.766). 




































price -0.0186*** -0.0137*** -0.0374*** 0.0161*** -0.0110*** -0.0080* -0.0103*** 
 (0.0030) (0.0034) (0.0076) (0.0046) (0.0034) (0.0043) (0.0025) 
discount -0.0191** -0.0227*** -0.0305*** -0.0154*** -0.0210*** -0.0172** -0.0195*** 
 (0.0095) (0.0085) (0.0116) (0.0039) (0.0080) (0.0084) (0.0048) 
salesAboveThreshold 0.3540*** 0.3408*** -- -- -- -- -- 
 (0.0239) (0.0320)      
salesAboveThreshold  0.0234** 0.0602*** -- -- -- -- -- 
     × discount (0.0102) (0.0180)      
lag CS 0.0685*** 0.0883*** 0.1055*** 0.1472*** 0.1078*** 0.1070*** 0.1071*** 
 (0.0042) (0.0051) (0.0072) (0.0093) (0.0057) (0.0074) (0.0014) 
days before 0.0281*** 0.0297*** 0.0356*** 0.0234*** 0.0340*** 0.0354*** 0.0330*** 
expiration (0.0045) (0.0048) (0.0060) (0.0052) (0.0051) (0.0060) (0.0030) 
merchant-created 0.0600*** 0.0599*** 0.0906*** 0.0632*** 0.0670*** 0.0771*** 0.0702*** 
deal (0.0191) (0.0202) (0.0258) (0.0180) (0.0197) (0.0185) (0.0134) 
facebook fans 0.0043*** 0.0046*** 0.0048*** 0.0034*** 0.0054*** 0.0045*** 0.0049*** 
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 (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0005) 
has review quotes 0.0282* 0.0387** 0.0463* 0.0333** 0.0450*** 0.0511*** 0.0448*** 
 (0.0153) (0.0155) (0.0241) (0.0153) (0.0170) (0.0191) (0.0143) 
sold out finally 0.1779*** 0.1948*** 0.2246*** 0.1782*** 0.2259*** 0.2102*** 0.2247*** 
 (0.0246) (0.0277) (0.0417) (0.0303) (0.0228) (0.0318) (0.0149) 
duration -0.2422*** -0.2337*** -0.2329*** -0.0687*** -0.2404*** -0.2258*** -0.2382*** 
 (0.0277) (0.0272) (0.0383) (0.0235) (0.0254) (0.0279) (0.0134) 
options -0.0176*** -0.0186*** -0.0184*** -0.0055 -0.0192*** -0.0174*** -0.0169*** 
 (0.0047) (0.0049) (0.0064) (0.0053) (0.0055) (0.0061) (0.0037) 
competing deals -0.0208*** -0.0208*** -0.0272*** -0.0135** -0.0227*** -0.0224*** -0.0214*** 
 (0.0050) (0.0049) (0.0080) (0.0053) (0.0058) (0.0064) (0.0043) 
maximum purchases  0.0016 0.0009 -0.0037 0.0015 0.0009 0.0007 0.0005 
     allowed (0.0033) (0.0037) (0.0051) (0.0035) (0.0040) (0.0035) (0.0021) 
use restriction proxy 0.0027 0.0028 0.0053 -0.0002 0.0020 -0.0010 0.0017 
 (0.0026) (0.0028) (0.0033) (0.0032) (0.0030) (0.0031) (0.0026) 
online deal -0.0428 -0.0417 -0.0795* -0.0205 -0.0435 -0.0412 -0.0404 
 (0.0473) (0.0494) (0.0466) (0.0571) (0.0545) (0.0528) (0.0413) 
multi-regional deal 0.0093 0.0081 0.0121 0.0076 0.0120 0.0144* 0.0105** 
 (0.0069) (0.0073) (0.0111) (0.0069) (0.0084) (0.0085) (0.0045) 
deal frequency -0.0016 -0.0024 -0.0072 -0.0032 -0.0074 -0.0014 -0.0084 
 (0.0077) (0.0082) (0.0105) (0.0076) (0.0091) (0.0086) (0.0068) 
division fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
subcategory fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
hour fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes 
day-division fixed effects No No No No Yes No No 
day-subcategory fixed effects No No No No No Yes No 
linear time trend No No No Yes No No No 
quadratic time trend No No No Yes No No No 
Observations 1,835,794 1,835,794 1,169,609 1,835,794 1,835,794 1,835,794 1,835,794 
R-squared 0.172 0.166 0.1582 0.1827 0.1322 0.1373 0.1586 
Notes. The dependent variable is log hourly sales. Robust standard errors clustered by product subcategory or deals in parentheses. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
PROPENSITY SCORE MATCHING (PSM) RESULTS (SECTION 4.6) 
We apply PSM to identify a sample of control deals without third-party reviews that match with 
the “treated” deals with third-party reviews. The first step is to use a Probit model to estimate 
the propensity of disclosing third-party reviews for all 19,978 deals in the sample. We use all 
available deal characteristics, including transaction price, discount percentage, days before 
expiration, merchant-created deal, Facebook fans, has review quotes, sold out finally, duration, 
number of options, number of competing deals, holiday percentage, maximum purchases allowed, 
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use restriction proxy, online deal, multi-regional deal, deal frequency, city, subcategory, in the 
Probit model. 
We use the one-to-one nearest neighbor without replacement matching method. In our 
setting, if no caliper (i.e., the maximum permitted difference between matched subjects) is set, 
the matched sample is quite imbalanced in the covariate distributions. Therefore, based on trial 
and errors, we use 0.01 as the caliper, which is the largest value that achieves full balance in all 
covariate distributions. All together, we identify 4,184 pairs of matched deals. All the covariate 
distributions are balanced between the treated and control groups. Table A.9 shows the t-tests 
of the mean differences between the treated and control groups in all characteristics (except city 
and subcategory). After PSM, the two groups are not significantly different. 
Table A.9. T-test results for matched and unmatched samples 
  Matched Sample Unmatched Sample 
  Mean 
t-test  
(Control – Treated) Mean 
t-test  
(Control – Treated) 
  Control Treated t Pr(|T| > |t|) Control Treated t Pr(|T| > |t|) 
ln(price) 3.306 3.318 -0.694 0.488 3.492 3.241 20.792 0.000 
ln(discount) 3.930 3.940 -1.221 0.222 3.989 3.905 14.000 0.000 
ln(days before expiration) 5.167 5.156 0.859 0.391 5.130 5.227 -10.281 0.000 
merchant-created deal 0.031 0.030 0.318 0.751 0.017 0.031 -5.847 0.000 
ln(Facebook fans) 3.353 3.277 0.809 0.419 2.444 4.931 -33.986 0.000 
has review quotes 0.008 0.010 -0.934 0.350 0.003 0.041 -15.523 0.000 
sold out finally 0.027 0.021 1.785 0.074 0.014 0.073 -17.819 0.000 
ln(duration) 4.487 4.482 0.794 0.427 4.478 4.486 -1.573 0.116 
ln(options) 0.541 0.552 -1.012 0.312 0.594 0.491 13.727 0.000 
ln(maximum purchases) 1.113 1.092 1.147 0.252 1.133 1.162 -2.324 0.020 
ln(use restriction) 5.981 5.976 0.478 0.633 5.934 6.010 -9.417 0.000 
online deal 0.008 0.008 -0.125 0.901 0.016 0.007 6.343 0.000 
multi-regional deal 0.259 0.251 0.828 0.408 0.327 0.309 2.500 0.012 
ln(deal frequency) 0.067 0.068 -0.225 0.822 0.061 0.066 -1.781 0.075 
ln(competing deals) 0.987 0.975 0.602 0.547 0.818 1.034 -15.426 0.000 
holiday percentage 0.327 0.325 0.510 0.610 0.328 0.332 -1.311 0.190 
 
CLUSTER ANALYSIS BASED ON THIRD-PARTY SUPPORT (SECTION 4.7) 
We conduct another cluster analysis using just two variables related to the third-party support: 
Facebook fans and has review quotes. Again, we select the number of clusters by comparing the 
average silhouette value for each 𝐾 ∈ {2,3, … ,10}. Here again, the highest average silhouette 




This cluster analysis separates the 19,978 deals into two clusters, one including 19,672 deals and 
the other including only 306 deals. As a matter of fact, the deals are now clustered purely by the 
has review quotes variable. The second cluster of 306 deals all have review quotes, whereas the 
first cluster of 19,672 deals do not have review quotes. However, the deals in the first cluster 
have more Facebook fans (mean = 25.81) than those in the second cluster (mean = 12.64). The 
difference is statistically significant (t = 3.11, p < 0.01). This implies the cluster analysis reported 
in Section 4.3 captures other deal differences instead of third-party support per se.  
SURVEY ON CONSUMER TRUST OF GROUPON REVIEWS (SECTION 4.6) 
In this survey, we explore consumers’ trust of the third-party reviews displayed on Groupon’s 
deal pages. Within the Restaurant category, we randomly chose five Groupon deals. Then, we 
extracted five restaurants with comparable review volumes and ratings from Yelp. We provided 
the screenshots of these 10 restaurants in the survey and asked respondents to rate, on a 7-point 
Likert scale, their trust in the review displayed for each restaurant (1 = lower trust, 7 = higher 
trust). The following table lists the restaurants used in the survey. The survey is available at: 
https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/KF3R9SR. 
 
Groupon merchants Yelp merchants 
Cavanaugh's Bar and Restaurant (Chicago) Hogwash (San Francisco) 
Benjamin Restaurant and Bar (San Francisco) The Spice Jar (San Francisco) 
Paper Moon (Washington, DC) Parson’s Chicken & Fish (Chicago) 
The Park Grill at Le Meridien (San Francisco) Print (New York) 




We administrated this survey along with the familiarity survey reported on page A4, i.e., 
we also obtained 50 responses from the residents in a big U.S. city via SurveyMonkey. The mean 
trust score for the reviews displayed on Groupon is 4.7, whereas the mean trust score for the 
reviews displayed on Yelp is 4.8. The difference is not statistically significant (t = 0.7, p = 0.24). 
Nevertheless, the direction of the difference is consistent with our expectation. 
DETAILS OF THE LAB EXPERIMENT (SECTION 5) 
We create the experimental deals based on the distribution of deals in the Groupon data shown 
in Table 1. We create multiple deals for several categories because they are more often offered 
on Groupon. For these categories with multiple deals, we create one experimental deal for each 
of their top subcategories. The following table summarizes the distribution of the 19 deals used 
in the experiment. 
Category 
Proportion 
in Groupon  
No. of Deals 
in experiment 
Top subcategories 
Automotive 1.36% 1 Car Wash & Detailing 
Beauty & Spas 26.18% 3 Massage; Hair Salon; Teeth Whitening 
Education 3.46% 1 Art Classes 
Entertainment 32.66% 4 
Concert; Theater & Plays; Sporting 
Event; Running Event 
Food & Drink 3.1% 1 Cupcakes/Dessert/Bakery 
Health & Fitness 9.03% 1 Fitness Classes 
Home Services 1.13% 1 Carpet Cleaning 
Medical Treatment 2.79% 1 Chiropractic 
Nightlife 0.3% 1 Pubs 
Pets Services 0.45% 1 Pet Boarding & Sitting 
Other Professional Services 3.67% 1 Photography 
Restaurants 15.87% 3 American; Italian; Asian 
Total 100% 19  
 
The following picture shows a sample deal page. To enhance realism, we create the deals 
by utilizing information on some (real) existing deals in the corresponding product subcategory. 
We used some fictitious names for the merchants to avoid any memory effect or bias due to the 
merchants’ names. We also chose the merchant address carefully so that they appear real to the 
subjects. For example, the merchant in the sample deal page below has an address in a popular 
shopping mall with many bakery shops. The hypothetical scenario presented to the subjects in 
this example is:  
“Suppose you want to buy a box of muffins for snacks, and you find the following 
deal on Groupon.” 
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After evaluating each deal, we asked the subjects to answer three questions measuring their 
perceived quality uncertainty, perceived quality, and willingness to buy (WTB) the deal. Following 
Pavlou et al. (2007) and Dimoka et al. (2012), we using the following single-item scale to measure 
the subjects’ perceived quality uncertainty: 
 
Please choose the extent to which you agree with the following statement: I am uncertain 
about the overall quality of X shown in the deal. [X is the name of the product featured in the 
deal. 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree] 
Shop address 
will appear here. 
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Following Peterson and Jolibert (1976) and Kirmani and Wright (1989), we using the following 
single-item scale to measure the subjects’ perceived product quality: 
Please choose the extent to which you agree with the following statement: The overall quality 
of X shown in the deal is high. [X is the name of the product featured in the deal. 1 = strongly 
disagree, 7 = strongly agree] 
We use the following item to measure the subjects’ WTB: 
How likely will you purchase this deal? [1 = extremely unlikely, 7 = extremely likely] 
 We recruited a total of 217 undergraduate and master’s students as subjects from in a 
large European University. We provided either a monetary reward of five Euros or course credits 
as incentives for participating in the experiment. The following table presents the demographics 
of the subjects. 
Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Female (dummy) 217 0.677 0.468 0 1 
Age 217 20.853 2.199 18 30 
Average monthly shopping frequency online 217 2.343 2.478 0 20 
Average monthly shopping frequency on Groupon 217 0.153 0.398 0 2 
 
Figure 3 plots the subjects’ responses. Table 10 presents the piecewise regression results. 
We tested the robustness of the regression results by choosing 50% and 55% as the breakpoint 
in the regression. Table A.10 reports the results, which are qualitatively the same as those 
reported in Table 10 in the main text. 
Table A.10. Threshold Effect of Discount for Different Breakpoints 




















       
discount (<60%) -0.0017 0.0034** 0.0295*** -0.0020 0.0042** 0.0316*** 
 (0.0018) (0.0016) (0.0022) (0.0020) (0.0018) (0.0024) 
discount (≥60%) 0.0160*** -0.0122*** 0.0020 0.0136*** -0.0106*** 0.0041 
 (0.0027) (0.0022) (0.0031) (0.0024) (0.0019) (0.0028) 
deal-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
subject-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
order-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,123 4,123 4,123 4,123 4,123 4,123 
R-squared 0.265 0.263 0.311 0.264 0.263 0.311 
Notes. All variables are specified in their original values (without taking logs). Robust standard errors clustered by subject in 
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